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Abstract
The negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) under the
Cotonou Agreement entered their final phase this year (2007). They have
presented some problems for the trade union organisations, both in the ACP
(African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries and in Europe. The point is that these
agreements will lead to structural reforms which will bring consequences for the
living and working conditions of the ACP populations. Accordingly, it is essential
for the trade union organisations to get actively involved in the negotiations and
the framing of these EPAs so as to guarantee that they comply with binding
criteria tying the integration of the ACP countries into the global economy with
the promotion of decent work, the reinforcement of social and economic rights
and respect for workers’ rights. That is why the Confédération syndicale des
travailleurs du Togo, on behalf of all the trade union organisations of the ACP
countries and the European Trade Union Confederation have ...
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The negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) under the
Cotonou Agreement entered their final phase this year (2007). They have
presented some problems for the trade union organisations, both in the
ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries and in Europe. The
point is that these agreements will lead to structural reforms which will
bring consequences for the living and working conditions of the ACP
populations. 
Accordingly, it is essential for the trade union organisations to get
actively involved in the negotiations and the framing of these EPAs so as
to guarantee that they comply with binding criteria tying the integra-
tion of the ACP countries into the global economy with the promotion
of decent work, the reinforcement of social and economic rights and
respect for workers’ rights. 
That is why the Confédération syndicale des travailleurs du Togo, on
behalf of all the trade union organisations of the ACP countries and the
European Trade Union Confederation have undertaken a project aimed
at ‘Boosting the capabilities of ACP trade union organisations in the
Economic Partnership Agreements’. They were supported by the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the
World Confederation of Labour (WCL), now dissolved and united
within the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) as well as
by the Bureau for Workers’ Activities at the International Labour
Organization.
This project has been made possible thanks to contributions from the
organisations themselves and financing from the European Commission
as part of the 8/9th Development Fund. We should like to express our
thanks here to the Project Unit and its director Mr Cumberbatch for
lending us support throughout the framing of the project. 
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Preface 
The guide and the trade union dossier which supplements it act as a
resource for negotiators from the trade unions by offering analyses of cen-
tral points with a view to promoting the social and human dimensions
of the EPAs.
They have been drawn up by the team under Professor Frédéric Lapeyre
made up of Thiery Amougou and Grégoire Ngalamulume, with the col-
laboration of the representatives from the European and international
trade union organisations, but also eight ACP experts (see list at annex)
with close ties to the trade unions in their countries and regions.
This publication has been produced in this format which combines the
two documents (guide and dossier) thanks to financing from the
International Labour Organization, sponsorship from the ARCOPAR
Group and financial support from ACV-CSC (Belgium) for the organi-
sation of a working seminar bringing together all the experts.
Our thanks go out, of course, to them and to all those within our organ-
isations who have monitored and backed the progress of this project.
We want this publication to be widely disseminated and used as a tool
throughout the negotiation regions. We hope in this way to help workers
in the ACP countries and their trade union representatives to achieve
the objectives of eradicating poverty and securing sustainable develop-
ment and gradual integration into the global economy as advocated by
the Cotonou Agreement. 
Adrien AKOUETE John MONKS Guy RYDER
General Secretary  General Secretary General Secretary 
CSTT ETUC ITUC
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Introduction
EU-ACP cooperation has significantly evolved since the Yaoundé
Agreements in 1963 and has introduced many institutional innovations.
These innovations are the result of dynamics within the EU-ACP
Agreements and of changes in a broader framework comprising inter-
national institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank, GATT/WTO
and the ILO, as well as changes in the international political and eco-
nomic contexts. Far-reaching changes in the past 40 years at world,
regional and national levels have inevitably brought about variations in
development demands in the ACP countries and development offers in the
EU.
Turning to the EU-ACP cooperation dynamic, the institutional picture
has changed greatly since the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which marked the
start of the European Community’s multilateral cooperation with
developing countries or regions. The Yaoundé Agreements, which were
accused of reinforcing neo-colonialism by reproducing the colonial
pact’s division of labour, were replaced by the Lomé Agreements, which
also turned out to be poorly adapted to the challenges of economic
globalization, the debt crisis, repercussions of structural adjustment
programmes, the failure of past development policies, the end of the
Uruguay Round (1986-1994) and the birth of the WTO in 1995, in
addition to the consequences of the end of the Cold War.
The Cotonou Agreement, signed on 23 June 2000, by the EU and 77
ACP countries, had the goal of taking on board the new rules of the
game of EU-ACP cooperation imposed by the globalized economy and
preserving, to the extent possible, a kind of development cooperation
that would heed the constraints of the new international architecture
and at the same time move towards a simple free-trade agreement.
However, it became clear that the liberalization of trade plays a central
role in recasting development cooperation between the EU and the
ACP countries, because it was put forward as a powerful means to con-
tribute to growth targets, to create jobs and reduce poverty. It is in this
new context that EU-ACP negotiations got underway in 2002 for the
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Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) that cover six regional areas –
the Caribbean, the Pacific and the four African zones of West Africa
(ECOWAS), Central Africa (CEMAC), East Africa (ESA) and Southern
Africa (SADC). The inclusion of South Africa, although not a part of
the ACP group, in the EPAs is still under discussion. The EPAs are
reciprocal free-trade agreements negotiated bilaterally between the EU
and the ACP regions or countries. Their goal is to bring EU-ACP trade
relations into line with WTO rules.
But the implementation of the EPAs will unavoidably lead to deep
structural reforms that will have consequences on the living and work-
ing conditions of the ACP populations. It is crucial that these struc-
tural reforms bring social advances and a reduction of poverty if the
EPAs are to keep their promises, otherwise they may well be rejected by
the people. 
In that connection, it is essential that the trade union and the non-gov-
ernmental organizations in the broad sense take an active role in the
negotiations for and the formulation of the EPAs in order to guarantee
that they keep to a few binding criteria that must combine participa-
tion in the world economy with the promotion of decent employment,
a strengthening of social and economic rights and respect for the rights
of workers. These criteria should be at the heart of concerns in regional
negotiations and should guide the formulation of the EPAs.
The basic goal of this guide is to provide the ACP trade unions with a
range of basic information on the Cotonou Agreement and the EPAs so
that their capacity to negotiate and table proposals is reinforced in the
process of establishing the EPAs. The EU-ACP negotiation process is
long and complex and negotiations will overrun the deadline of 31
December 2007. The trade unions must therefore mobilize and demand
their rightful role in the formulation of the EPAs. The Cotonou
Agreement offers a unique framework for the participation of trade
unions given that the signatory states are committed to overhaul the
way they formulate development policies. This opportunity must be
seized and the resources earmarked for this purpose must be made
available. To achieve that, access to information is fundamental, but the
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trade unions often suffer from a lack of information about EPA-related
issues, about the state of negotiations and the arrangements for access-
ing resources to increase their capacities. 
Therefore, this guide presents the main trade union issues arising from
the new institutional framework introduced by the Cotonou
Agreements and the EPAs and emphasizes the related risks and oppor-
tunities. It also provides a range of trade union claims that must be put
forward by the trade unions at national and regional levels in the con-
text of the EPA negotiations. Lastly, it offers a road map for taking up
future challenges. 
It should be recalled that this guide is accompanied by a trade union
dossier that develops in a detailed fashion a range of EPA-related issues.
It is also acts as a resource for negotiators from the trade unions by
offering analyses of central points with a view to promoting the social
and human dimensions of the EPAs.
European Union-ACP relations: a trade union vision
Since 1957 (Treaty of Rome) the European and international trade-
union movement has always attached a great deal of importance to and
shown interest in the establishment of fair relations between the EU
and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries in order to
contribute to the economic and social development of countries in the
Southern Hemisphere. 
At the time, this entailed not only the independence of the countries
concerned, but also ambitious economic and social development pro-
grammes with adequate means and resources, as well as structural
reform in trade (prices for raw materials and their stability and organi-
sation of the markets) in monetary matters, in technology transfers, so
as to implement a world programme. 
Relations have often stayed bilateral, with a minimum of transfers for a
European development policy. Colonial relations were succeeded by
neo-colonial types of dependence relations. All measures indispensable
to finding the ways and means of real development were, generally, sab-
otaged during world negotiations on the same subjects, with a view to a
new economic and social world order. This opposition from political
and economic, European and world actors, was in total contradiction
to the generous intentions announced in the two Yaoundé Conventions
(1963 and 1969) and in the Lomé Conventions (1975, 1980 and 1985).
Positive aspects
Nevertheless, the trade-union movement did seek and support the
many positive aspects that were gradually introduced in the agree-
ments, establishing the EU-ACP relations, in particular: 
- the contractual character of the agreement between 2 regions (the
north and south of the planet) with its commitments programmed over
time and reciprocity implications in the responsibilities; 
- a positive concept of development, articulating the closely interwoven
social, economic, ecological and cultural aspects; 
- the taking into account of the role of women;
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- the promotion of civil, political, economic and social rights, which
constitute human rights and democracy; 
- the development of human resources;
- the successive improvements of the agreements (joint institutions and
advisory – including socio-occupational – bodies). 
While supporting these innovations, the European and international
trade-union movement, has always stated that it was concerned about
the implementation of the Convention, in relation with its objectives.
From situations in the field, the trade unions have constantly drawn the attention of policymakers
and technical officials of the Convention on the growing distance between words and deeds. 
For 30 years, regular socio-occupational consultations like the seminars
organised by the European Economic and Social Committee have had
minimal if any impact at all on the contracting parties of the EU and
the ACP. This has moreover played a role in legitimising an imitation
democratic functioning of successive Conventions. 
To be sure, the Convention has had positive effects in many fields:
infrastructure and facilities. It has also attenuated, through Stabex and
Sysmin, even more harmful consequences for the producers and the
countries. 
Nevertheless, there is a very serious efficacy deficit and a considerable
disproportion between the sums allocated in the last 40 years to these
relations and the results, even if it is worth qualifying according to
companies and regions. 
The trade-union movement has often insisted among European and
ACP officials on a more dynamic promotion of decent employment
and social protection as well as the taking into account of the attain-
ments of the community-based and mutual assistance economy, in par-
ticular of workers in the informal economy. 
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A few milestones in the history of development cooperation between 
the EU and the ACP 
Treaty of Rome signed by 6 European countries. The Belgian and
French – chiefly African and overseas – colonies are associated. 
Yaoundé I Convention between the EEC and 18 newly independent,
essentially French-speaking states and Madagascar. Area of action: trade
(tariff preferences), financial and technical cooperation (with, above all,
economic and social infrastructure projects). 
Yaoundé II Convention. Virtual identical renewal of Yaoundé
Agreement I. 
Great Britain joins the EEC and consequently, several countries of the
Commonwealth and former British colonies will have to integrate the
agreement. The former French-speaking states of Africa and
Madagascar, together with those of the Commonwealth and former
British colonies form the Africa – Caribbean – Pacific (ACP) group
after the signing of the Georgetown Agreement. 
Lomé I Convention with 46 ACP countries. It aims to create a develop-
ment model based on partnership and solidarity and enshrines the
financing of infrastructures and facilities and agricultural programmes;
establishes the STABEX: a system for offsetting the deficit in export
earnings after the fluctuation of prices on the world markets, and
grants non-reciprocal tariff preferences for ACP exports to the EEC. It
also provides favourable protocols for ACP actors in sectors such as
sugar, beef and bananas. 
Lomé II Convention with 58 ACP countries. Extension of Lomé I; cre-
ates the Sysmin compensation mechanism, a sort of Stabex adapted to
mining products. 
Lomé III Convention, signed by 65 ACP countries which enshrines the
emergence of the policy dimension in cooperation relations by estab-
lishing a dialogue on policies. Lomé III enshrines the gradual abandon-
ment of the approach by projects in favour of a sectoral approach, the
stated aim being food self-sufficiency and security. The environment is
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1963
1969
1973
1975
1980
1985
one of the dimensions given wide support by this Convention, which
also provides for support for structural adjustment. 
Lomé IV Convention signed by 68 ACP states for 10 years with a revi-
sion midway through (revised Lomé IV in 1995). It reinforces the policy
dimension and the support to structural adjustment. New element:
introduction of (political and economic) conditionalities. 
revised Lomé IV Convention (70 countries); human rights and the rule
of law become conditions precedent. Introduction of the concept of
sustainable development and the need to get integrated in the world
economy; the fight against poverty. 
Green Paper, a discussion document released by the European
Commission. Open to debate on the challenges and options for renego-
tiating the partnership when revised Lomé IV expires, on the eve of the
21st century. It takes account of the end of the cold war, the creation of
the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the impact of conflicts and nat-
ural disasters, the internal institutional context of ACP countries, and
the mitigated success of Lomé. An invitation is issued to negotiate a
new convention that takes account of this development of the interna-
tional context. 
Cotonou Agreement signed by 77 ACP countries.
Strengths and weaknesses of EU-ACP relations
The contractual character of the Convention is a leading qualitative
element in relations between ACP countries and the European Union.
It supposes a responsibility for undertaken commitments (objectives,
priorities, functioning), and above all for their implementation. For the
European and international trade-union movement, the responsibilities
are shared. Without wishing to draw up a bill of indictment, we may
identify a series of problems: 
- The absence of transparency concerning the national indicative pro-
grammes and the financial sums pertaining thereto in most ACP coun-
tries; 
16
1990
1995
1996
2000
- The opposition to or reticence about democratic practices involving the
populations for improving their well being, through trade-union, social
and associative organisations. These organisations are often considered
to be subversive inasmuch as they wish, as is normal, to remain inde-
pendent of the State and its structures. More satisfactory situations do
exist of course, and positive developments have seen the light of day
recent, but they concern only a minority of ACP countries; 
- The under-utilisation of the Convention’s potential, because of lack of
political courage and the dispersion of technical capacities and reti-
cence in strengthening common competencies; 
- The national and regional divisions have weakened the contractual rela-
tionship of the ACP group with the European Union. The possibilities
offered by the Convention, in particular for regional cooperation (Title
XII) have been neglected, especially in Africa; 
- The bad distribution of the Agreement’s advantages. The impact of the
Convention has concerned chiefly a minority fraction of the popula-
tion and has fed the networks of the well-to-do or clienteles, thereby
promoting corruption. From this perspective, too many choices (con-
ceptions, operators, places of application) were made according to
short-term and mercantile policy interests where “speculators” from EU
and ACP countries got together. The impact of the Lomé Convention
concerns only a minority of the African population, and a slightly
larger – yet still minority – group in the Caribbean and the Pacific.
About 80% of the population is in the informal sector in Africa, and
therefore nearly outside the field of influence of development pro-
grammes. 
- The internal policies of the European Union. They are increasingly per-
vaded by a neo-liberal conception, whence the progression of economic
and social malfunctions. Whereas the Convention has always been
drafted with a conception of social development in mind, there is an
impression that for more than twenty years, practices have been increas-
ingly imbued by the neo-liberal ideology. 
- The positions assumed by the Member States and the Union in inter-
national institutions are not consistent, and at times even contradic-
tory. A coordination of the policies of the Union and the Member
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States in monetary and economic authorities (IMF, World Bank,
WTO) in close consultation with the institutions that have social or
educational mandates (ILO, WHO), as well as in regard to debt relief,
is also needed. 
- Contradictions in the internal and external policies of the Union.
These are in particular in the treatment of migrants, but also for agri-
culture, fisheries, trade, the development of services, etc. Other institu-
tions (the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee,
the EEC-ACP Joint Assembly, in particular) have provided explana-
tions; 
- Problems on the wider front of the distribution of competencies
between the Union and the Member States on relations with ACP
States as well as mandates among other international institutions. The
policies pursued by the European Union are different from those of the
Member States, whose particular interests in regard to ACP countries
diverge. Privileged relations exist... in particular with former colonising
States, including economic and political rivalries among some of the 15. 
- The political and technical incapacity to integrate social provisions in
the Lomé programming: employment, social protection, appropriate
training, health, improvement of living conditions. It is not a matter of
coming up with “separate” programmes on these issues, but of making
them elements that constitute the objectives of ALL the programmes,
with obligations of results sanctioned by evaluations. 
- A reduced vision of development cooperation. Cooperation cannot be
reduced to the gradual integration in the world market by the “free
market forces,” the strengthening of competitive capacities of products
and resources from ACP countries. It is necessary to define the objec-
tives of development that is concurrently economic, social, environ-
mental and cultural, the means and resources to be deployed in order to
reach those objectives, and their application procedures. 
- The limits of the private sector. In spite of its great importance, the pri-
vate sector is incapable of taking up, on its own, the economic and
social challenges that exist in nearly all ACP countries. Nevertheless,
the private sector could play a decisive and efficacious role in “mixed
economy” systems, comprising: 
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• The promotion of private economic actors as part of the eco-
nomic and social programming of the country or the region, in
accordance with the needs and priorities of the populations; 
• Efficient, competent and decentralised public sectors that can
fulfil missions in the public interest (organisation of services); 
• Encouragement to economic and social innovations of the infor-
mal, rural and urban sectors. 
- For the trade-union movement, regional economic and social integra-
tion could become a major option of a future Convention. It would be
a means for counterbalancing the negative consequences of the
Uruguay Round on the preference margins of ACP countries in their
trade relations with industrialised countries. In these different regions,
the diversification of trade and services could be organised through: 
• The internal market: the improvement of living conditions, by
trying to meet the essential needs, would strengthen the produc-
tion and service activities in favour of the populations; 
• A regional market, where equipment, complementary produc-
tions and services could strengthen the multiple potential and
meet a part of the demand through regional trade; 
• Export markets, by developing products or services that could
enter in competitive systems. 
This desirable diversification will be built up slowly, so it will be indis-
pensable to introduce transitional measures adjustable according to
countries and products. Among these provisions, the promotion of
direct channels of fair trade between economic and social actors in the
North and the South must be encouraged and reinforced. 
Finally, taking into consideration social and ecological criteria in
regional or national development policies should be part and parcel of
programmes intended to provide guidance and support for such poli-
cies, including in their commercial dimension. 
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The Cotonou Agreement
The Cotonou Agreement was concluded in June 2000 by the EU and
the ACP to promote and accelerate the economic, cultural and social
development of ACP States, to contribute to peace and security and to
promote a stable and democratic political environment. Its duration is
20 years, with a clause providing for a revision every five years. 
The Cotonou Agreement is based on the principles of partnership and
solidarity, and sets three main objectives: 
• The reduction and, in the long term, eradication of poverty in
ACP countries; 
• Sustainable development; 
• The gradual integration of ACP countries in the world econ-
omy. 
The Agreement wants to be based on the trilogy of political dialogue,
trade and development to reach its objectives. 
This entails in particular: 
• The definition of appropriate development strategies and a con-
centration on the objective to reduce poverty; 
• The development of a new economic and commercial coopera-
tion framework and the gradual integration of ACP countries in
the world economy; 
• The reinforcement of the political dimension;
• The promotion of the participation of non-state actors; 
• The improvement of technical and financial cooperation. 
The participatory approach is one of the major innovations of the
Cotonou Agreement, which establishes a framework for the participa-
tion of the civil society, including the trade unions of ACP countries.
The Agreement contains numerous references to the civil society and
provisions relative to the participation of non-governmental actors are
contained in more than thirty Articles of the Cotonou Agreement, as
well as in a final declaration and in Annex IV relating to implementa-
tion and management procedures. 
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Civil society is mentioned in the Joint declaration relating to the partnership actors (declaration 1,
annex to the final act), in annex IV, Article 4, in the Compendium on cooperation strategies and in
the programming guidelines. The justification of the role of the non-state actors is provided in
Articles 2, 4 to 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 17, 19 to 24, 25, 33, 37, 56, 57, 58, 65, 70, 71, 72, 74 to 78 and 81 that
were signed by the ACP States and that must consequently be fulfilled.
The role of non-state actors in the development process is recognised
through: 
• Participation in the definition of programmes and projects; 
• Consultation and participation in the political dialogue; 
• Support for strengthening their capabilities.
The main actors of cooperation recognised by the Cotonou
Agreement are the (local, regional and national) public authorities
and the non-state actors. The State is the main actor of the
Agreement, but must act in partnership with the non-state actors.
Article 6 of the Cotonou Agreement thus defines the “non-state
actors:” the private sector, economic and social partners, including
trade-union organisations, and the civil society in all its forms accord-
ing to national characteristics.2
The participation procedures are defined in each State, but Article 4
indicates the way in which the civil society must be involved.3 In the
spirit of the Cotonou Agreement, non-state actors must participate in
the charting of policies on cooperation for development, their imple-
mentation and their evaluations. To that end, they must be informed
and involved in the consultation on cooperation policies and strategies,
have access to financial resources in accordance with conditions fixed
by the Agreement, and be provided with reinforcement of their capaci-
ties to support the local development processes. 
It is provided that up to 15% of the funds allocated to each ACP coun-
try under the NIP could be used by the organisations of the civil soci-
ety. Nevertheless, the allocation of these funds is not uniform in all
ACP countries; they are at times non-existent or less than 15% in cer-
tain countries. 
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2. The documents of
the Commission (DG
Development) specify
the categories. In
addition to workers
and employers, these
are organisations for
the defence of
human rights, grass-
roots organisations,
organisations of
women, associations
of young people,
organisations for the
protection of chil-
dren, representatives
of the indigenous
populations, organi-
sations for the pro-
tection of the
environment, agricul-
tural organisations,
consumers’ associa-
tions, representatives
of religious organisa-
tions, NGOs and asso-
ciations from the
cultural sector and
the media. 
3. The actors of the
civil society must be
constantly informed,
be provided with
financial resources,
be involved in the
implementation of
cooperation projects
and programmes, and
be provided with
capacity-building sup-
port in cultural and
economic sectors in
order to improve
their organisations
continuously. 
The Cotonou Agreement has instilled an impetus in the civil society of
ACP countries to identify its own priorities. It has also made it possible
to establish and consolidate organisations that can be officially recog-
nised as eligible partners under the new partnership. The presence of
Articles that “require” the active participation of civil society in order to
be implemented has facilitated the process of institutional reinforce-
ment of non-state actors. 
The decentralisation of responsibilities to actors in the field for greater
efficacy and the introduction of a sliding programming system that
allows for a regular adjustment of cooperation programmes are also
part of the specific features of Cotonou. 
The main aid instrument is the European Development Fund (EDF),
the management cycle of which is five years. 
The European Development Fund (EDF) 
Presentation
Created in 1957 after the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the European
Development Fund is the main instrument of Community aid for
cooperation on development to the ACP States and to overseas coun-
tries and territories (OCT). It is therefore the main financial instru-
ment for EU-ACP cooperation. It is fed by contributions from the EU
Member States. 
Periodicity
Each EDF is concluded for a period of about five years. Since the first
partnership convention in 1963, the EDF cycles have in general fol-
lowed those of the partnership agreements/conventions. 
• First EDF: 1959-1964
• Second EDF: 1964-1970 (Yaoundé I Convention) 
• Third EDF: 1970-1975 (Yaoundé II Convention) 
• Fourth EDF: 1975-1980 (Lomé I Convention) 
• Fifth EDF: 1980-1985 (Lomé II Convention) 
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• Sixth EDF: 1985-1990 (Lomé II Convention) 
• Seventh EDF: 1990-1995 (Lomé IV Convention) 
• Eighth EDF: 1995-2000 (Lomé IV Convention and revised
Lomé IV) 
• Ninth EDF: 2000-2007 (Cotonou Agreement) 
• Tenth EDF: 2008-2013 (Cotonou Agreement) 
EDF instruments 
The main instruments of the EDF are the development cooperation
facility in the long-term (non-refundable aid) that grants a specific allo-
cation to each ACP country, including an ordinary allocation for devel-
opment projects and programmes and an occasional allocation for
unforeseen needs, as well as additional financial resources to countries
that apply cooperation activities successfully; and also the investment
facility, which is medium- or long-term financing, chiefly in the form
of loans or guarantee funds, to support the development of the private
sector in ACP countries. This fund is managed by the European
Investment Bank (EIB) and the investment facility committee (com-
posed by representatives of the Member States). 
The budget intended to finance long-term cooperation contains a spe-
cial allocation intended to support regional cooperation and the eco-
nomic integration of the regions. 
The criteria for assessing the needs and performances for the allocation
of the various resources as well as for the eligibility for the various loans
and funds are set out by the agreement. 
Implementation of the EDF 
The Country Strategy Paper defines the cooperation framework
between the European Union and each ACP country and region for a
period of five years. This strategy is implemented through the National
Indicative Programme (NIP) and the Regional Indicative Programme
(RIP). This document establishes the distribution of the EDF funds
among the priority concentration sectors, a financial calendar with
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forecasts in commitments and outlays, as well as a provisional imple-
mentation timetable. 
The programming is therefore the plan on how to use the EDF. It com-
prises 4 stages: 
• The preparation and development of a cooperation strategy
(CS) based on the medium- and long-term development objec-
tives and strategies; 
• A clear indication, by the Community, of the indicative pro-
grammable financial package that a country may have for a five-
year period, as well as all useful information; 
• The preparation and adoption of an indicative programme for
implanting the cooperation strategy; 
• A review process pertaining to the cooperation strategy, the
indicative programme and the volume of resources allocated
thereto. 
The Cotonou Agreement pertains to important innovations in the
implementation of the EDF. For one, the entire, extremely complex
structure of 10 instruments under Lomé is reduced to two instruments.
Furthermore, aid will no longer be automatic: the initial allocations to
ACP countries must reflect both current needs and previous perform-
ances. An evaluation system will be used to ensure a continuous adjust-
ment of the orientation and volume of the funds both to the needs and
to performances. Finally, aid is concentrated in priority areas desig-
nated by the European Union under its development cooperation pol-
icy. 
The National indicative programme (NIP)
* NIP: an indispensable instrument for the implementation of each
ACP’s cooperation strategy. When the programming of actions that
benefit and involve two or more ACP states or all of them, and/or a
regional body whose members include at least two ACP states, it is
called a Regional Indicative Programme (RIP):
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This programming includes the following:
• The preparation and development of a cooperation strategy
based on medium-term development objectives and strategies of
the country itself;
• A clear indication from the EU regarding the programmable
indicative budget that the country will have during a five-year
period as well as any other useful information;
• The preparation and adoption of an indicative programme in
order to set in motion the cooperation strategy;
• A review process covering the cooperation strategy, the indica-
tive programme and the volume of resources allocated to it.
Cooperation Strategy: the basis of the programming of aid allocated by
the EU to the various ACP countries over a five-year period, drawn up
jointly by the ACP and the EU after consultation with a broad range of
actors involved in the development process. It must be adapted to the
needs and the specific context of the state concerned.
Allocation of resources: in keeping with needs and the performance of
each ACP State, in accordance with ad hoc criteria.
Preparation and adoption of the NIP: this process involves exchanges
of views between the concerned ACP State and the EU. It is adopted by
common agreement between the ACP State and the EU. Once adopted,
it binds the EU and the concerned State. Six priority areas are set out
by the European Commission: links between trade and development;
cooperation and regional integration; macroeconomic policies; food
security and sustainable rural development; a strengthening of institu-
tional capacity; and good governance and the rule of law. 
Review process: flexible and ongoing adaptation of actions in line with
the agreement’s objectives and with changes in the context of the State;
annual operational review for the NIP, a mid-term review and, lastly, a
final review for the NIP and the RIP.
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Trade union position on the Cotonou Agreement 4
The trade-union movement is satisfied with several provisions of the
new agreement, on condition that they are really implemented, and in
particular: 
• The participation of non-state – including trade-union – actors
in all the activities and in all the areas of cooperation; 
• The explicit references to the fundamental rights of the ILO, as
essential elements of the validity of cooperation, but also as cri-
teria to meet in commercial cooperation; 
• The social and sustainable development objectives and the prin-
ciple that there could be no optimal economic development if
not accompanied by parallel social development. These concepts
must go together if economic progress is to be fully efficient and
bring about an improvement in the way of life and the well-
being of the populations;
• The transparency of the programmes, based on the commit-
ments undertaken in the 15 EU Member States and 71 ACP
countries in international institutions (UN, ILO, WHO,
UNESCO);
Conversely, the trade-union movement is concerned about the ambigu-
ities and shortcomings of this agreement, and in particular: 
• The free-trade aspects, which often seem to prevail over the
objectives and practices of cooperation; 
• Although rendered flexible and subjected to evaluation, the inte-
gration of ACP countries in world trade entails major risks for
the economic and social development capacities of these coun-
tries and the well-being of their population; 
• The negligence of priority problems such as debt and structural
adjustments as well as access to essential goods and services; 
• In view of previous experience, serious doubts remain as to the
will and capacity of the contracting parties to apply the social
objectives and participatory methods. 
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The Economic Partnership Agreements
The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) are the economic dimen-
sion of the Cotonou Agreement and are governed by Article 37 of the
Agreement. They must be signed by 31 December 2007 and have the
goal of “...fostering the smooth and gradual integration of the ACP States
into the world economy, with due regard for their political choices and
development priorities, thereby promoting their sustainable development
and contributing to poverty eradication in the ACP countries” (Article 34,
paragraph 1). More generally, they take part in the application of the
development strategy as described in Articles 19 to 27 (title 1) of the
Cotonou Agreement.
The EPAs are scheduled to start on 1 January 2008 and will run for 12
years. Given the complexity and the issues involved in EU-ACP negoti-
ations, a transition period has been planned from 2000 to 2008. A first
phase, running until the end of 2003, was held for the entire ACP
group and then, starting in 2004, specific regional negotiations took
place.
The EPAs put in place by the Cotonou Agreement can be considered as
reciprocal free trade agreements which have to be negociatied on a
bilateral base between EU and the ACP regions.
Beyond the overriding objectives expressed, the EPAs are designed to
bring EU-ACP relations into line with WTO rules. The preferential
regime, which was reserved for the countries of the ACP group and was
not open to all developing countries, did not comply with WTO rules,
in particular the Most Favoured Nation and the Reciprocity clauses.
The EU-ACP negotiation schedule meets this requirement for compli-
ance with the WTO rules because it give the EU until 31 December
2007 to fall into line. 
In a general way, the Cotonou Agreement calls for the gradual elimina-
tion of barriers to trade between the two parties and the introduction
of ACP regional integration zones, which are common markets, charac-
terized by a common external tariff, and the free movement of goods
within the zone.
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More specifically, these agreements have a threefold objective: 
• Facilitate access of ACP products to European markets
• Develop South-South trade
• Support the regional integration process
The final aim of the EPAs is to enable the ACP States to take full part
in international trade, which is held up as the best way of achieving
growth and reducing poverty.
Characteristics of the EPAs
The EPAs can be characterised by certain major features: 
• They are free-trade agreements: the European Union and the
ACP countries are required to open their markets gradually and
reciprocally. The EPAs provide for the liberalisation of trade in
three steps: first, within a regional grouping of the country; then
within the different regional markets of the Southern
Hemisphere; and finally between the countries of the North and
the South. 
The creation of regional markets will make it possible to open
the most isolated countries to the outside world and to develop
private companies. To this end, the countries will have to adopt
a common customs system and to eliminate choke points that
hinder the free movement of goods. 
As regards the liberalisation of the North-South trade, the
European Union proposes a pragmatic and flexible approach
that will enable each region to negotiate safeguard measures for
vulnerable sectors. Furthermore, the European Union is aware
that its quality standards for products risk penalising the exports
of ACP countries. Aid programmes and the extension of transi-
tion periods and the change of the original rules will be negoti-
ated to facilitate the entry of ACP products on the European
market. 
• These agreements provide for financial aid for regional integra-
tion: the financial aid must help to support the costs of the com-
mercial opening and the necessary adjustments. The European
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Union will provide financial support to the regional integration
process and to the establishment of partnership agreements. The
Commission wishes that the aids to the economic partnership
agreements be integrated in the current regional programmes. 
• These are regional agreements. Contrary to previous treaties, the
EPAs will be signed by the EU and the ACP countries, this time
grouped into six zones: the Caribbean, the Pacific, and 4 African
zones, i.e. West Africa (ECOWAS), Central Africa (CEMAC),
East Africa (ESA) and Southern Africa (SADC). In Africa in
particular, the distribution of countries into zones has not taken
account of existing relations. 
Terms and conditions of the EPAs 
The new trade agreements will be introduced gradually and therefore
the parties recognise the need for a preparatory period. This prepara-
tory period expires on 31 December 2007 and these agreements must in
theory enter into force on 1 January 2008. 
During the transition to the new trade agreements, the non-reciprocal
trade preferences applied under the fourth ACP-EC Convention are
maintained during the preparatory period for all the ACP countries,
under the conditions defined in Annex V of the Cotonou Agreement. 
The negotiations of the economic partnership agreements will be con-
ducted during the preparatory period, and will be geared in particular
to establishing a timetable for the gradual removal of barriers to trade
between the parties, in accordance with the relevant WTO rules. The
negotiations will take into account the level of development and the
socio-economic effect of trade measures on the ACP countries, and
their capacity to adapt and to adjust their economies to the liberalisa-
tion process. The negotiations will therefore be as flexible as possible
when fixing a transition period of sufficient duration, the final coverage
of the products, taking due account of sensitive sectors, and the degree
of asymmetry in terms of the timetable for dismantling the tariffs,
while remaining compliant with the WTO rules in force at the time. 
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At present, the second phase of bilateral negotiations has been officially
launched with the 6 regional groups: 
– Central Africa: October 2003, Brazzaville (Republic of Congo),
– West Africa: October 2003, Cotonou (Benin),
– East and Southern Africa: February 2004, Mauritius,
– Caribbean: April 2004, Kingston (Jamaica),
– Southern Africa Development Community (SADC): July
2004, Windhoek (Namibia),
– Pacific: September 2004, Fiji Islands.
The negotiations currently in progress with the six regions are long and
complex. The deadline set for the end of 2007 will probably not be
met. The transition period will be longer, and will extend well beyond
2008.
It should be noted that the EPAs are not compulsory. But if an EPA is
not established, there may be discrimination in the ACP between the
least developed countries (LDC) and the non-LDCs because the first
have in any event free access to the EU market under the “Everything
but Arms” initiative, while the non-LDCs have access to the EU market
via a system of generalized preferences that covers all developing coun-
tries. The signing of an EPA is therefore much more important for the
non-LDCs than for the LDCs.
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Trade-union position on the EPAs
The trade unions in Europe and in the ACP countries contend that
trade and economic integration should raise the standards of living and
of work, not lower them. 
“You cannot eat growth” 
The reality of the social problems in the ACP countries poses a pro-
found challenge to the righteous sequence of liberalisation, growth and
reduction of poverty, which forms the basis of the descriptive aspect of
the dominant neo-liberal discourse, and in particular the central place
that liberalisation policies hold in structural adjustment policies. In this
context, caution is needed when it comes to development policies shift-
ing to policies to fight poverty, where any discussion of redistribution
and employment is put aside to focus and reaffirm growth as the key
objective. Economic growth is one of many aspects of development
which is a wider, more complex, and not solely economic process. Now
the EPAs are geared exclusively to economic growth, the increase of
international trade of the ACP countries in the globalized economy.
The EPAs reaffirm the hypothesis of positive repercussions of growth
which neo-liberals count on, whereas past experience has amply shown
that growth has benefited only a minority in the ACP countries. The
failure of structural adjustments show that it is not enough to liberalise
in order to improve the living and working conditions – quite the con-
trary! 
The Cotonou Agreement and the EPAs must guarantee that human
rights, and in particular social rights, are accorded more importance,
over any commercial or financial aspect. These rights must be inte-
grated systematically in all EPA negotiations at regional level. 
Whereas certain objectives can be approved, e.g. the creation of
national or regional markets that existed only potentially, it is worri-
some to note the very unequal control of markets and their compo-
nents; the burden of debt in most ACP economies; the importance of
the informal economy (60 to 80% of workers); the low capacities of the
political, economic and social players; the absence or very low level of
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purchasing power, etc. All these elements do not plead in favour of eco-
nomic and social development. 
The growth of trade between ACP countries takes higher priority for
these countries than the opening of their markets to EU products. It is
worth taking account of the need – which has been recognised, inci-
dentally – to sequence trade liberalisation measures. And the liberalisa-
tion measures duly accepted between the ACP countries must take
priority over the liberalisation measures in regard to the EU. As a mat-
ter of fact, an exaggerated opening of the ACP markets to EU competi-
tion would wreak havoc on the economies of the ACP countries,
whereas an effective integration of the ACP regions would guarantee
that the countries concerned would derive more advantages from a sub-
sequent integration with the EU. 
However, we must also analyze the consequences of regional integration
when, in a given region, there are partners with very unequal levels of
economic development, accompanied by considerable risks for the
weakest link in the productive chain. 
Economic restructuring in the ACP countries will bear a high price tag
and require enormous resources from the EU in the long-term, in
accordance with the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement. The gov-
ernments, in particular those that depend largely on customs revenues,
will suffer greater budgetary pressure, as the liberalisation of trade will
reduce such revenues. This will in turn have a serious impact on the
personnel of public services in numerous ACP countries, as well as on
the capacity of governments to provide essential public services such as
health and education. 
Impact studies are indispensable before and after insertion decisions.
The EU and the ACP must take measures rapidly to carry out studies
on the economic and social impact of the economic and trade policies
proposed in the countries and regions concerned. 
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The trade-union movement insists that this programme be multidi-
mensional and on a large scale, and provide for: 
– A cancellation/reduction of the debt and a re-conversion of it in
negotiated social and economic activities per country, in favour
of the populations; 
– The addition of official development aid on top of such finan-
cial resources, that should be increased (up to 0.7% at least) rap-
idly; 
– A rehabilitation of the education and health services, designed as
public services, and accessible without discrimination; 
– Measures to guarantee income for small rural producers and
small-scale fishermen; 
– Active policies to promote and protect decent jobs (in synergy
with the ILO’s ‘Decent Work’ strategy). 
Impact of the EU-West Africa Economic Partnership Agreement 5
Regional integration
Regional integration will have several consequences, some positive and
others negative, for the sustainable development of the region. First of
all, tax revenues will fall, which will reduce the capacity of states to
intervene and will raise the issue of alternative financing. However, the
expansion of the market and the elimination of internal customs barri-
ers may be a strong stimulus for the regional economy, provided that
the market is genuinely fluid and that the sensitive sectors are suffi-
ciently protected from European imports.
The elimination of customs duties for imports from Europe: a loss
of resources for the states
The EU is West Africa’s biggest supplier. Moreover, the liberalization of
the West African market will bring about a big reduction in customs
revenue.
Increase in imports from Europe and greater competition for local
production
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Most studies concur that the introduction of an EPA will increase
imports from the European Union. The creation of trade, i.e., addi-
tional imports, could reach US$ 647 million. The elimination of cus-
toms duties on European products could create a trade diversion, that
is to say that European imports may replace imports from another
region, in an amount estimated at US$ 390 million. In all, the gain in
exports for the European Union could be around US$ 1 billion, equal
to around 15% of current exports. 
Rapid liberalization unanimously discouraged
A scenario for rapid and total liberalization is regarded by the sources
studied as dangerous for West Africa. Competition in farm imports
from the European Union risks annihilating the positive results of
regional integration. Most people assert that a more progressive sce-
nario is preferable, with the possibility of continued protection for farm
and food production in the region.
Few new opportunities for the least developed countries (LDC)
Thanks to the Everything but arms initiative, the LDCs will have duty-
free access to the European market for all products in 2009, and with-
out an obligation to open their borders. On the other hand, they must
sign an EPA, which requires they open their market to European prod-
ucts.
The benefits for the non-LDCs if tariff barriers are lifted
Nigeria, Ghana and the Ivory Coast are three West African countries
that are not LDCs. Their exports are mainly farm products, ore and oil
& gas (Nigeria in particular). A better access to the European market
would have little impact on the volumes already being exported. On
the other hand, it would develop exports of new products, in particular
processed farm products with higher value-added, some of which are
still liable for customs duties. 
But if an EPA can improve access to the European market and develop
new exports, the goods produced must make it to European territory.
To achieve that, these new exports must first meet the demands of the
buyers and health legislation.
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A risk of regional imbalance and non-sustainable exploitation of
natural resources
Regional integration, if successful, runs the risk of favouring the geo-
graphical areas with the best production factors, to the detriment of less
advantaged areas. In a word, the coastal countries that enjoy better
agro-climatic conditions should develop more easily.
Evaluation of needs and obstacles to the trade-union movement in
the ACP countries 
There is a large similarity in the needs and priorities of the trade-
unions of the ACP countries to play their rightful role in negotiations
on the EPAs as provided under the Cotonou Agreement. The needs are
felt in four inter-dependent fields, i.e. information, intellectual and
technical training, organisation, and the improvement of institutional
capabilities. 
On the information front, the trade unions are calling for a more effi-
cacious information system so that they can get more in-depth knowl-
edge on the procedures, practices and policies of the Cotonou
Agreement which several trade-union members say they are familiar
with in a global and summary manner. The intellectual and technical
training needs of the trade unions and their members are felt in the
areas of globalisation (stakes of the globalized economy), macroeco-
nomic indicators (meaning, interpretation and limits), international
trade, the NEPAD and the WTO (institution, rules and operation).
The objective is to acquire a capability for evaluation and negotiation
with state and international actors who, generally, keep the trade
unions out of the discussions, arguing that they understand nothing
about international trade. The shortcomings and needs in terms of
organisation call for the establishment (or where, they already exist, the
boosting) of national, sub-regional and international synergies between
the trade unions. 
Consequently, the last trade-union demand states a need to boost the
institutional capabilities of the trade unions at national and regional
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level. To this end, the priorities of the trade-union demands in the ACP
countries are: (1) to improve the basic knowledge of trade unionists; (2)
to expand the training schemes on trade agreements in particular for
general secretaries and activists; (3) to identify resource individuals with
knowledge and skills in trade and to support them to disseminate said
knowledge; (4) to support a concrete lobbying plan on the question of
work; (5) to have publication possibilities; (6) to have financial support
so as to be able to conduct analyses and to disseminate information
among grass-roots activists; (7) to improve the participation framework
of the trade unions and the civil society in the negotiation process; (8)
to improve the analyses of the informal sector and the protection of
those who work in it. 
It is also advisable to ensure access for the ACP trade unions to the
resources of cooperation for development. In general, the ACP trade
unions are not even aware that these funds exist. So they have no access
at all to the recourses of cooperation for development. They do not
know the access procedures and the mechanisms through which they
can apply for and obtain such resources. This situation is due to a lack
of information between the governments, which are generally familiar
with all the clauses of the Cotonou Agreement, and the trade unions,
which at times lag behind on the information front. Furthermore, sev-
eral trade unionists are very ill informed about the internal provisions
of the NIPs and the RIPs. Similarly, the relay role that the ACP States
have to assume between the EU and the non-state actors does not facil-
itate access for the trade unions to information and even less so to
resources of cooperation for development.
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Participation: moving from speeches to reality is no mean feat
Participation today looks like the magic formula of development poli-
cies, just as structural adjustment and liberalization were in the 1980s
and 1990s. But in practice, the participation of non-state actors is still
too weak and is limited to mere information and communications
without really bearing in mind the demands and proposals of the other
development actors.
The goal of reorienting development cooperation for the benefit of the
non-state actors and the new forms of conditionality relating to good
governance underpinned the democratization and decentralization
process in the 1990s in the South. This evolution was conducive to the
development of new partnerships, which led to a broader scope of com-
petences in the private sector, civil society organizations and local
authorities.
The recent report from the Secretary General of the United Nations on
civil society expresses very accurately this new vision of development
based on the promotion of public-private partnerships. The central idea
is that we must take advantage of potential or existing synergy gener-
ated by the different development actors and bring into contact the
stakeholders who are grappling with the same problem.6 Cooperation,
when identifying the objectives and defining the project, tends to
improve the project, which is then enriched and more firmly anchored
in reality and in step with the demands of the development of popula-
tions.
Furthermore, a redefinition of the roles and responsibilities of the
national and local public actors (private sector or civil society) should
lead to improvements in the management of a whole range of essential
services because “Where capacity is devoted to multi-stakeholder
processes, the pay-offs have been significant”. These partnerships now
constitute a very useful tool for development cooperation and for
finding innovative responses to critical questions. The Millennium
Development Goals also acted as a catalyst for the partnerships in the
field among the public authorities, the private sector and the civil
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society organizations, because these objectives cannot be achieved with-
out concerted action by all concerned.
The broadening of development cooperation to include a wide range of
actors, such as civil society as well as local public authorities and mem-
bers of parliament, is regarded as “an opportunity to mobilize new
capacities and diverse experiences in order to take up some of the most
demanding problems of the day”7 The recommendations from the
Cardoso Commission are very clear on this subject. The UN must
emphasize the inclusion of all stakeholders and be aware that the key
actors are not always the same in all cases. It is therefore vital to encour-
age partnerships with different stakeholders in order to find effective
solutions and enable a whole range of world networks to innovate and
to make headway.
New world governance must therefore be built on the promotion of
participation and responsibility at all levels. But the commitment from
the stakeholders and the development of partnerships call for a
strengthening of civil society and private sector organizations, provi-
sions for forging compromises including creative conflict prevention
and resolution mechanisms and the training of national and multina-
tional civil servants to deal with a broad range of stakeholders. To that
end, it is necessary to create an institutional environment able to
encourage these new partnerships and to give the various stakeholders
involved the means to act and to develop their potential.
Decentralized cooperation, introduced as early as 1989 in the context of
the Lomé IV Convention, was a new approach to development cooper-
ation. Its goal was to expand the usually small number of cooperation
actors by legitimizing the role of decentralized actors involved in devel-
opment.8 Its innovation was the support it offered to initiatives that
came directly from the grassroots. The responsibility of defining needs
and the formulation and implementation of the projects was trans-
ferred to local actors. They were no longer regarded as mere beneficiar-
ies or implementers of projects that were designed by others upstream,
but as promoters of improvements in their working and living condi-
tions.
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The role of decentralized cooperation as a new development coopera-
tion instrument was reaffirmed in the revised Lomé IV Convention
that stipulates in Article 12: “Recognizing that decentralized coopera-
tion actors can make a positive contribution to the development of the
ACP States, the contracting parties agree to intensify their efforts to
encourage the participation of ACP and Community actors in coopera-
tion activities.”
The main aim of decentralized cooperation was to provide a better
response to the needs and priorities of the populations, thanks to the
broadening of the range of development actors via the establishment of
new types of partnerships among the national public authorities and
local authorities, the private sector and civil society organizations. The
idea was to promote a redefinition of the role and responsibilities of all
involved in the development process by backing a process of accounta-
bility of the actors through the transfer of responsibilities and a decen-
tralization of means.
This new approach to cooperation and development was advanced even
further by the European Commission under the Cotonou Agreement
signed in June 2000. The Agreement includes original provisions
designed to promote participatory approaches with a view to securing
the participation of civil society and economic and social actors. In that
connection, the non-state actors received support for strengthening
their capacities in vital areas so as to improve their skills, in particular
in organizational matters, representation and the introduction of con-
sultation mechanisms in order to promote strategic alliances. 
In order to meet the development needs of local groups and to encour-
age all the decentralized cooperation actors to make a contribution to
the independent development of the ACP States, development cooper-
ation must support, on the one hand, the financing of micro-achieve-
ments at local level that have an economic and social impact on the life
of the people and, on the other, the financing of decentralized coopera-
tion, in particular when joined by the efforts and means of the organi-
zations in the ACP States and their counterparts in the European
Union. 
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Another good vector for the participation of non-state actors in devel-
opment cooperation are the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP)
that were introduced at the end of 1999 as part of a joint IMF and
World Bank initiative. Their objective is to help poor countries and
donors to boost the impact of their joint efforts in the fight against
poverty.
The objectives of the PRSPs are many, but a primary one is the promo-
tion of the participation of non-state actors by means of a range of par-
ticipatory techniques and the creation of areas for dialogue and
bargaining. Also worthy of note is the creation of internal and external
partnerships on a new basis resulting from a more or less significant
redistribution among the different development actors of roles and
responsibilities including, on the one hand, the government, the local
public authorities, the private sector and civil society actors and, on the
other, the government and the international donors.
However, the preparation of the PRSPs is problematic and unsatisfac-
tory. The wealth of recommendations made by the civil society actors
are usually ignored. Lastly, not all of the strategy for combating poverty
is open to the participation of civil society actors because the priority
objective of adapting to the globalized economy is not even up for dis-
cussion. Consequently we have pointed out that the PRSPs have not
opened the door to alternative development strategies and remain, on
the contrary, very close to the previous structural adjustment pro-
grammes, although the form has been changed and they now include
participatory procedures.
As mentioned by the International Labour Office, which has analyzed
trade union participation under the PRSPs, the trade unions have not
been systematically consulted. They have even been totally excluded in
certain countries. However, in the absence of a genuine debate with
workers’ representatives, and their employers, the chances of achieving
the sought-after policies are low9.
It is therefore surprising to note the excessive use of the terms “partici-
pation” and “participatory”, while most often consultation is not even
offered. The new paradigm of development remains focused on the
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assumption that integration into the globalized economy and the adap-
tation of its rules are the unavoidable side of any development
approach. The paradox of the new approach to development coopera-
tion is found in the fact that it claims to listen to non-state actors
while, at the same time, it fears that their claims and initiatives may
stray from the path of dialogue that it has so carefully marked out. In
other words, they may take part provided they do not seek to change
the rules of the game and do not demand a radical redistribution of
resources and power.
But the trade union movement’s efforts must not be allowed to wane. It
must continue to influence the process by which development policy is
devised. Its role is essential and it must claim its new responsibilities as
specified in the PRSPs and in the Cotonou Agreement. The trade
unions must see to it that the ACP States assume their commitments
and must appeal to the European Commission and its delegations in
the ACP States to ensure that those commitments are fulfilled.
Trade-union participation in the ACP countries
Deep differences have been observed in effective trade union participa-
tion in negotiations and in the attention paid to their claims by the
ACP States. Whence the following three groups: 
a) 1st group of ACP trade unions: no trade- union participation and no
participation by workers’ associations, although such organisations exit
The strategies to exclude trade unions and workers’ associations from
participation come in many guises. The trade unions are continuously
out of step with the government when it comes to information, and
either lack information, or faced with attempted corruption or
stonewalling by the government. The problem to solve in this area for
the first group of ACP countries remains intact. It comes down to
allowing trade unions to participate, and taking their opinion into
account in the decisions and implementation of development policies.
The countries of West Africa (Togo, Guinea), Central Africa (RCA)
and East and Southern Africa (Burundi), the Caribbean and the Pacific
(Vanuatu, Kiribati and the Granada islands) which are part of this
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group show that there is a possible link between the crisis in the
national democratic process, and the absence of participation by the
trade unions and workers’ associations in the national policies. 
b) 2nd group of ACP trade unions: participation by trade unions and work-
ers’ association without taking due account of their demands 
This is the situation in the ECOWAS countries, where there is partici-
pation by the trade unions and workers’ associations, but where their
demands and observations are not taken duly into account in the appli-
cation of development policies. This is the case in Benin, Burkina Faso
and Senegal. In this second group, the step to dialogue and participa-
tion in negotiations has been made. That of taking due account of the
demands of trade unions and workers’ associations remains to be nego-
tiated and honed, so as to prevent the dialogue that already exists from
degenerating into a dialogue of the deaf. This would turn the social dia-
logue into an instrument for the local governments. Senegal is on the
right track to solving this problem through institutional innovations. It
adopted a tripartite national charter on the social dialogue in 2002,
while establishing a National Social Dialogue Committee (NSDC).
This 2nd group has one of the main characteristics of the political
regimes in a large number of African States in this group, i.e. the pres-
ence of a purely institutional democracy, without any concrete and real
application in the means of action. 
In Central Africa, countries like Cameroon, Gabon, and the
Democratic Republic of Congo are part of this group, as are the
Comoros in Southern Africa. In the Caribbean and the Pacific, the
countries of this group are Jamaica, Surinam, Haiti, the Fiji Islands and
the Dominican Republic. 
c) 3rd group of ACP trade unions: participation by trade unions and work-
ers’ association with due account taken of their demands
Finally, the third situation is that of ACP countries in the Caribbean
and the Pacific, where trade unions and workers’ associations partici-
pate effectively in the negotiations and their demands are taken into
account in the implemented policies. This is the case of Barbados and
Ghana, where the trade unions are respected and take part in trade and
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government policy negotiations. This third group, which consists only
of two countries, has already taken the two steps, i.e. participation and
due account of trade union demands in policies. Vigilance and the con-
stant challenge of these attainments nonetheless remain the best instru-
ments to adopt in order to avoid regression in the field of dialogue and
the participation of the EPAs in the development and decision-making
process. 
Trade-union proposals for the EPAs 
These agreements must without fail have a social dimension. 
If these agreements have no effective social dimension, the populations
will have no confidence in these provisions. The success of these agree-
ments depends in large part on the confidence that the populations and
the main actors can show them. So the economic partnership agree-
ments must reinforce the social capital in the ACP States and regions.
To that end, social objectives and participatory implementing method-
ologies are needed, in particular through the social dialogue. The
National Indicative Programmes, stemming from the Cotonou
Agreement, have shown all the difficulties, as the participation by non-
state actors, which has been highly selective (excluding the trade unions
in particular), is limited. 
These agreements should contribute to the economic and social devel-
opment of these regions and lead to a significant improvement in the
living and working conditions of the populations concerned. 
It is important that the negotiations at the level of all the ACP coun-
tries comply with certain obligatory criteria: beyond a well-advised
integration in the world economy, trade should be developed, accom-
panied by the relevant social rights, the reduction of poverty, and the
respect of workers’ rights.10 These criteria should guide the regional
negotiations. 
The EPAs must guarantee that human rights, and in particular social
rights, within the meaning of the ILO, are accorded greater importance
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10. Article 50 of the
Cotonou Agreement
and fundamental
standards of the ILO. 
over every commercial or financial aspect. These rights must be system-
atically integrated in all EPA negotiations at regional level. 
This should hinge on three major themes: 
Promotion and guarantee of rights
The guarantee of fundamental social rights, enshrined in the Cotonou
Agreement (preamble) as essential elements shared by the contracting
parties of the Cotonou Agreement. These are 8 agreements concerning
fundamental social rights (tripartite declaration of the ILO adopted by
the International Labour Conference of 1998). 
This concerns:
• The freedom of association (Convention 87)
• The right to organise and collective bargaining (Convention 98)
• The banning of forced labour (Conventions 29 and 105)
• The gradual elimination of child-labour and the banning of
work affecting the dignity of children (Conventions 138 and 182)
• The equal treatment of men and women, nationals/aliens
(Conventions 100 and 111). 
But the international labour code also comprises 70 operational con-
ventions. 
The Conventions relative to these topics specify the objectives, proce-
dures and the arrangements for the implementation and guarantees of
these rights. These rights are indispensable conditions for the dignity
of individuals residing in a territory. They constitute the basis of every
social policy. Article 25 of the Cotonou Agreement stipulates that
social development must promote the respect of fundamental social
rights. 
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In addition to these fundamental rights, other rights resulting from the
ILO Conventions must be considered, because they are pertinent in the
economy, in particular: 
• Social protection (Convention 102)
• Maternity protection (Convention 183)
• Employment policy (Convention 122)
• Labour inspection in industry (Convention 81) and in the agri-
cultural sectors (Convention 129) 
• Migrant workers (Convention 97)
In principle, for these Conventions to be legally applicable in a coun-
try, they must be ratified by that country (an official legal act).
Nevertheless, the fundamental social rights (8 conventions) must be
applied in all the ILO Member States by the very fact that they are
members of the organisation (this is the case of all the EU and ACP
states). In its technical cooperation programme, the ILO provides
advice when a country wishes to revise or improve its legislation. But
the ILO is confronted by the World Bank which advices the country
(with arguments relative to loans) on options often opposed to those of
the ILO. 
It is worth underscoring that numerous aspects relative to employment,
social security and equality between men and women as well as the
close connection between the development of trade and labour stan-
dards are contained in a rather general fashion, only in the preamble of
the negotiating mandate given to the Commission on the EPAs.
Equal opportunity and gender equality
• Equality between men and women is considered today an important
factor in social and institutional changes in favour of fairness and
growth and, consequently, must be clearly affirmed in all policies and
development actions.
• The ILO invokes international labour standards to promote equality
between men and women, in particular the four main conventions
relating to equality: Convention 111 on discrimination (employment
and occupation), Convention 100 on equal pay, Convention 156 on
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workers with family responsibilities and Convention 183 on maternity
protection.
• Resolutions from the International Labour Conference dating from
1975, 1985 and 1991, and the Resolution concerning the promotion of
equality between men and women, equal pay and maternity protection,
of June 2004, which reinforced this approach. The ILO has chosen to
take up this issue in two ways. First, all policies, programmes and activ-
ities must strive to always take account of the specific, and at times
diverging, needs of men and women, in particular practical and strate-
gic needs particular to women. Second, targeted interventions, based
on prior analyses of needs and concerns, should be designed to enable
men and women to participate in and benefit equally from develop-
ment efforts.
• Issues relating to gender are regarded as themes and horizontal issues
in Article 31 of the Cotonou Agreement. Therefore, cooperation must
contribute to the strengthening of policies and programmes that
improve, guarantee and broaden equal participation by men and
women in all sectors of political, economic, social and cultural life. It
must also contribute to improving women’s access to all resources nec-
essary for the full exercise of their fundamental rights on the basis of
specific measures. Equality between men and women is affirmed by
the Agreement.
• Objective 3 of the millennium declaration supports the promotion of
equality and empowerment of women. Without gender equality, we
cannot vanquish hunger, poverty and disease.
• In addition, particular efforts must be made at every level – local,
national, regional and international – to ensure that women, indige-
nous populations, ethnic minorities and others, such as migrants, have
equal access to goods.
A concrete social development strategy must be applied to two essential elements
against poverty
• The promotion of decent work 
• The promotion of social protection 
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The emergence of local and regional markets means that the popula-
tions must have purchasing power. The promotion of work as well as
systems of social protection must generate regular revenues. 
The promotion of decent work
The promotion of decent work (with fair and decent working condi-
tions) must be pursued in all sectors of production (crafts, rural sectors,
formal public and private sectors, informal sectors).
Three options must be taken into consideration 
• Regional integration 
• The promotion of mixed economy systems (market economy,
community-based economy) 
• The diversification of trade and products 
To be sure, productive investment is a key factor of this strategy. Thus,
the measures provided in the Cotonou Agreement (Annex II, Chapter I,
Articles 1 to 15) must be implemented with greater dynamism in order
to support the industrialization effort and the development of infra-
structure with the support of the European Investment Bank. 
The performance of contracts for infrastructure and facilities and serv-
ices, financed by the EDF, must be entrusted, as a matter of priority, to
ACP economic operators, who could be provided with appropriate
technical assistance. 
A programme for processing primary products in the ACP regions
(energy, mines, agricultural and fishing products, etc.) should be devel-
oped in order to increase the value-added of national production, to
diversify production and to promote job creation. 
The promotion of fair trade must also be considered systematically so
as to contribute to regular revenues for the producers and to the selling
of the products. 
Decent work must be accompanied by specific measures: 
• Initial and continuing training 
• Vocational and technical training (manual workers, clerical
employees, managers, technicians, executives) 
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• Labour relations, flanked by collective bargaining agreements
and assisted by labour inspection, consisting of advice and assis-
tance for the production sectors.
Particular attention must be paid to the continuing training, pay and
working conditions of public service employees, teachers and health-
care professionals, as well as to the promotion of equal opportunities
for women. 
Similarly, questions of health and safety at work in all production sec-
tors must be addressed with concrete measures, with the competent
support of the labour authorities. 
In all areas, cooperation with the ILO programmes (for example, the
simultaneous improvement of productivity and working conditions)
may contribute to the improvement of this strategy. 
The informal sectors often employ the majority of the working labour
force, in many EPA regions. These are sectors with extensive, diverse
and complex activities. These marginal sectors, as they are known, con-
tribute to the GDP of the countries, provide products and services for
populations that are not very solvent, and especially since these sectors
provide revenues, albeit precarious, and make job-creating activities
possible (production of goods and services, community-based econ-
omy). 
The trade-union movement has often noted in the past, that the con-
tracting parties of Cotonou and previously Lomé, the national and
European public authorities, were totally disinterested in these sectors,
although they have registered positive results under difficult conditions,
that prove more efficient than the contribution of multinationals in the
ACP countries. 
With the support of the International Labour Office, the contracting
parties of each EAP should consider a negotiated programme (eco-
nomic, commercial, social and fiscal aspects) that contributes to a grad-
ual and fair integration of these informal sectors in the formal, public
and private, rural and urban sectors. 
48
The public contracts for infrastructure works and facilities should con-
tain, without fail, social specifications pertaining to the ILO
Conventions (fundamental social rights). With a system of points cov-
ering various requirements (value for money, expiry dates, etc), the best
performer on the social front (jobs created and supplied, guaranteed
social rights) should get a good mark in terms of points.
Decent work
• Decent work means suitable, acceptable, productive and carried out
under conditions of freedom, equity, safety and dignity;
• Decent work includes full employment, social protection, fundamental
rights to work and social dialogue, i.e. the key components of social
justice;
• It is a concept of the ILO. It provides a general framework for action in
socio-economic development:
• The indicators are the possibility of performing productive and suitably
remunerated work; safety at work and social protection for families;
improved prospects for personal development and social integration;
freedom for human beings to express their concerns, to organize and
take part in decision-making in areas that have an impact on their life;
equal opportunity and treatment for all men and women. 
• How to promote it: Actions at world level should mobilize the main
players of the multilateral system and the global economy around this
objective. At national level, the integrated programmes drawn up in the
countries by the principles of the ILO defining the priorities and the
targets in the context of national development. The ILO works to pro-
mote decent work in its actions relating to employment, social protec-
tion, standards and the principles and fundamental rights to work and
social dialogue.
• Improved coordination in national and international policies is neces-
sary for improving the prospects of sustainable growth that would pro-
mote advances in productive investment, the development of
businesses, in particular small and medium sized companies, and the
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creation of decent jobs. It may also help countries to tackle globaliza-
tion difficulties.
• Reducing unemployment on its own is not enough. We must above all
reduce and eliminate unacceptable jobs and dreadful conditions that
have low productivity or are carried our under duress.
• The promotion of decent work is a joint responsibility of the principals
of the ILO and the Bureau.
The promotion of social protection
Social protection and employment are the main tools for fighting
poverty. The lack of these two elements creates economic and social
insecurity in the populations. Social security systems exist, in theory, in
most of the ACP countries, but owing to a lack of finances, they often
cover only a minority of workers in the formal sector. However, there is
no coverage for the vast majority of the population and there are no
income substitution benefits such as sick pay, unemployment benefits,
and pensions. 
Health in particular is a neglected area; all the populations of the ACP
countries are demanding access to quality medicine, irrespective of
their place of residence. 
Moreover, the absence of real health policies is a serous obstacle to the
development of trade and the economy. Epidemics such as AIDS,
malaria, tuberculosis, malnutrition, etc. take their toll on the produc-
tion sectors. 
It is a complex problem that the local, regional and European public
authorities have to take into account. Even if charity activities can fill
the gaps temporarily and provisionally, which is indispensable, they are
public policies of social justice. 
In this field, the self-organisation of men and women working in infor-
mal sectors often generates community-based economy initiatives in
many areas, and particularly in health (mutualisation of the risks),
which, thanks to the use of micro-credits and micro-insurance, provide
partial, yet real, solutions to the needs of the people. In general, these
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efforts are little known and receive little support from the public
authorities. 
European contracting parties should be reminded that their social secu-
rity systems stemmed from similar initiatives by European working-
class circles in the 19th and — the early years of — the 20th century. 
A fund for the promotion of social protection should be created in each
EPA, financed by public and private contributions to provide gradual
solutions. The development and support of economic and social
achievements should constitute a decisive contribution to this aspect of
the fight against poverty. 
This strategy should be pursued efficiently through an active general
participation method, thanks to the social dialogue, an objective
enshrined in Article 25 of the Cotonou Agreement.
Universal access to essential goods and services must be ensured and
liberalization practices or the application of the private sector’s cost-
efficiency logic must be rejected in sectors that are key for human
development, such as the water sector.
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Trade-union road map
This guide is a work in progress tool that can be expanded with the
support dossier during national, regional and sectoral seminars and
workshops.
It is a tool for responsible and effective actions, for mobilising workers
and populations so that each Economic Partnership Agreement can
have an effective social dimension. 
Role of the European and international trade-union movement 
The European trade and development commissioners have all stated in
writing that the EPAs must include an effective, negotiated and partici-
patory social programme.
It is therefore necessary to negotiate a general framework agreement so
that the essential aspects are contained in each EPA: 
- Guarantee of social rights;
- Joint strategies for decent work and social protection; 
- Negotiated implementation, under the aegis of European and
ACP public authorities, among economic operators from all
sectors of activity and representatives of workers from these sec-
tors.
This requires reasoned interventions among the officials of European
institutions (Parliament, Economic and Social Committee, Council of
Ministers) and the ACP (Committee of Ambassadors, Secretariat of the
Group). 
The European national trade unions should take similar steps among
their national and European members of parliament and their govern-
ment. 
The national and regional ACP trade unions 
In each region, task forces monitor trade negotiations.11 The organiza-
tions representing civil society must without fail be consulted by the
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11. They comprise
representatives from
each state and from
the Commission, via
delegations.
task force in order to listen to their analyses, their proposals on social
aspects and, more generally, on all development-related problems.
In so doing, the civil society representatives must structure themselves
at regional level and have a permanent organization enabling them to
draw up their positions on a collective basis. The European Union
must contribute financially and technically to the creation and start-up
of such a project.
It is therefore essential to do the following:
1. Establish a regional trade-union structure in the 6 negotiation regions
of the EPAs, with at least 2 representatives from each national organisa-
tion of the region. If needed, elect standing officers. 
2. The regional trade-union team produces a file on the state of negotia-
tions for the Economic Partnership Agreement (Impact studies? Who
are the negotiators? Consensus reached). 
3. The regional trade-union team requests a working meeting with EU
and ACP negotiators from the region
• What is the state of the negotiations?
• Information on social aspects already broached;
• Presentation of trade-union proposals (3) with a view to the
social dimension of the EPAs 
At the same time, these proposals are made in each national govern-
ment of the region. 
4. The regional trade-union team contacts the other workers’ representa-
tives (public sectors, private sectors, craftsmen, informal sectors) and
apprises them of the trade-union plan for the social programme of each
EPA (guarantee of social rights, promotion of decent work and social
protection) and the establishment of a Regional Social Dialogue
Committee. 
5. The regional trade-union team demands that a tripartite negotiating
structure be established, comprising 
• EU-ACP national/regional public authorities 
• Economic operators from different sectors (private and public
sectors, craftsmen, rural sectors and informal sectors)
• Representatives of workers from different sectors 
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6. The regional trade-union team draws up a negotiating plan with all the
actors, including practical matters:
• Assume the costs of the participation of trade-union actors –
travel, accommodation 
• Possibility to call on experts by the trade unions
• Negotiate with the regional EPA team as well as at national
level, the possibility of gaining access to funds so as to partici-
pate under good conditions in this responsibility exercise, as
established by the Cotonou Agreement. 
Every EPA must be flanked by a regional social-dialogue committee
Every regional committee is made up of the national and regional pub-
lic authorities who are party to the EPA and qualified representatives
(employers and employees from all the production sectors: craft work-
ers, fishermen, rural sectors and forestry, public and private sectors and
the informal sectors) who are organized or in the process of organizing.
The remit of the social dialogue committee is to achieve two additional
objectives:
• access by all men and women and social rights guarantees
• drafting and application of the social development strategy
- promotion of decent employment
- promotion of social protection
The public authorities and the representatives of the productive sectors
negotiate and decide, by means of a bipartite or tripartite contract, the
necessary arrangements and procedures for the effective achievement of
this social dimension.
Where necessary, other sectors, such as consumers’ representatives and
environment NGOs, can enter into commitments for the satisfactory
achievement of these objectives.
The European and international trade union movement is well aware of
the challenges that this strategy poses for the ACP trade unions. That is
why it has set up and financed, with a subsidy from the Project
Management Unit (8th EDF) and the assistance of the Workers’
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Activities department of the ILO, a programme to boost the capacity of
ACP trade unions, in particular in the areas mentioned (decent employ-
ment and social protection) by means of active and responsible partici-
pation in social dialogue.
The Extraordinary Summit of the African Union held in Ouagadougou
in September 2004 in order to promote productive employment and to
combat poverty via decent work, decided on a series of measures,
pointing out that the protection of fundamental rights of workers and
social dialogue “are irreplaceable tools for development”. 
During the Summit, both sides of industry (African employers and
workers) confirmed their joint undertaking to promote, decent employ-
ment and social protection, via the systematic use of social dialogue. 
Now is the time for responsible and effective action
We hope that in 2007, we will be able to mount and finance a technical
assistance project so as to make full use of this Guide to implement the
social supervision of the EPAs.
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This trade union dossier supplements the trade union guide which presents the main
trade union issues arising from the new institutional framework introduced by the
Cotonou Agreement and the EPAs and emphasizes the related risks and opportunities.
It likewise provides a body of knowledge and analyses to help boost the capabilities of
the trade union organisations at the national and regional level in the framework of the
negotiation of the EPAs.
It also acts as a resource for negotiators from the trade unions by offering analyses of
central points with a view to promoting the social and human dimensions of the EPAs.
Trade union dossier for boosting 
the capabilities of ACP trade union
organisations in the Economic
Partnership Agreements
Sheet 1: Privatisations and their issues in the ACP
Why privatisations?
- The economic crisis affecting many ACP countries from the nineteen-
eighties onwards is largely to be laid at the door of the poor manage-
ment of many public enterprises by the States. The remedy
recommended and applied by the structural adjustments consists in
privatising these enterprises.
- The neoliberal criticism against the State, fed not only by the concept
of the market economy, but also by the idea that the citizen is a con-
sumer or a client of public services, insists on efficacy, profitability
and evaluation in changing the development model in the ACP by
covering the public management in discredit.
- Privatisation is sometimes put forward as a condition for the granting
of a loan to an ACP country by the IMF and the WB.
- It should be noted that it is not whether the production factors are in
public or private ownership that determines the socio-economic suc-
cess of an enterprise, but how it is managed and the general macroeco-
nomic and socio-political environment in which it is operating (the
presence or absence of corruption, the presence or absence of misap-
propriation, whether or not there is compliance with accounting and
budgetary rules, not straying from objectives set). So it is not just pri-
vatised enterprises that work, as the dominant neoliberal discourse
would have people believe.
What is a privatisation?
- A privatisation means the total or partial transfer of ownership of
the productive factors of an enterprise, from the public sector to the
private sector.
What are the various arrangements in a privatisation?
- A privatisation occurs in line with two arrangements, transfer and
concession. 
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- Privatisation by transfer means that the State sells off all the assets of
a public enterprise to the private sector.
- Privatisation by concession means that the State signs a joint man-
agement contract with the private sector on the basis of clearly
defined specifications. In this case, the State retains part of the assets
of the public enterprise and transfers the other part to the private sec-
tor.
What are the general effects expected from a privatisation?
The socio-economic effects expected from a privatisation can be
achieved only if the competition conditions are first satisfied. These
socio-economic effects are:
- An improvement in the quality of the services provided to consumers
by the enterprise thanks to competition;
- A drop in the price of that service thanks to competition;
- A rise in the quantities offered to consumers thanks to competition;
- A financial adjustment consisting of saying to whom (the public
and/or private sector) the enterprise belongs;
- A real adjustment consisting of stating what is to be produced, how
it is to be produced, and in what quantities and at what price it will be
produced.
What are the issues in privatisations in the ACP?
Privatisations have had disastrous social and political effects in many
ACP countries. We have seen:
- an increase in the prices of the services provided by the privatised
enterprises (water, electricity, healthcare etc);
- a deterioration in the quality of the service (repeated interruptions in
the supply of water and electricity);
- a loss of sovereignty for the States in strategic sectors (energy);
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- a deterioration in access for vulnerable populations to essential goods
and services (notably, to water and healthcare);
- a rise in the recovery rate leading to breaches of contract and the rise
in the use of unsafe drinking water by populations unable to pay their
bills on time (as in South Africa, the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, etc);
- a rise in epidemics as a consequence of the increased use of unsafe
drinking water;
- a deterioration in healthcare access conditions.
What can be done to avoid these negative social effects?
- Avoiding these disastrous social effects consists of defining a set of
specifications in such a way that the socio-economic situation of the
populations after privatisation is better than the socio-economic sit-
uation of the populations before privatisation. To do this, it is neces-
sary:
- To see to it that privatisation does not lead to the transformation of a
public monopoly into a private monopoly 12. This has tended to be
the majority situation in many ACP countries in sub-Saharan Africa. It
has engendered disastrous social consequences (price rises, a rise in ille-
gal supplies, increased prevalence of epidemics, deterioration in the
services and loss of State control over vital and energy supplies);
- To favour privatisations by concession, where the State can retain a
right of inspection and veto, rather than privatisations by transfer,
where all decision-making power is handed over to the private enter-
prise;
- To encourage competition between private enterprises applying to
purchase the public enterprise, and to choose the ones which best sat-
isfy the demands in the political and socio-economic specifications;
- To ensure that alongside the State, the NSAs participate in the defini-
tion of these political and socio-economic specifications;
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12. We talk of a
monopoly when we
have only one party
on the supply side
against a multitude
on the demand side.
If that one supplier is
the State, we talk of
a public monopoly; if
it is private we talk of
a private monopoly.
- To submit the extension of the management contracts with the private
sector to the constraint of the socio-economic results achieved after
a period laid down in the specifications;
- The NSAs, the State and the private enterprise must deliver a price
for the service or the resource such that the least well-off social classes
are not excluded;
- Privatisations in the water, healthcare and education sector must
ensure that the general interest is preserved and that ‘healthcare for
all’, ‘water for all’ and ‘education for all’ remain realities in the ACP;
- Privatisations must not lead to social regression which would
adversely affect the battle against poverty.
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Sheet 2: Issues in public-private partnerships for essential goods
and services 
Whereas traditionally, the State had borne the responsibility for access
for the population to essential services, the South has for two decades
been seeing a major growth in the role of the private sector in health
and education and a trend towards the privatisation of water and elec-
tricity supplies and sanitation services. Three reasons have been
adduced for this development: scant public resources; the mediocre
quality of the public service; and pressure in favour of economic liberal-
isation. The dominant idea is that a public service does not always rep-
resent the best solution where the institutions are shaky and the use of
the public purse lacks transparency. The problem identified by the
Bretton Woods organisations, among others, is thus that far too many
public services are being poorly managed by the public authorities
responsible. In addition, suffering from an acute lack of resources,
many States in poor countries cannot guarantee effective and universal
public services, or finance major infrastructure investments for the
maintenance and development of such services. This situation forms a
major hurdle to the achievement of the United Nations Millennium
Goals and in particular the goal of halving the proportion of people
lacking access to safe drinking water by 2015.
This is why the World Bank systematically insists that the States make a
commitment to seek greater efficiency in the use of public funds and a
better price-benefit ratio for these essential services. The pursuit of
these objectives has taken the form either of the privatisation of these
essential services, or a radical switch in the method of public manage-
ment of these services. On the one hand, privatisation has made it pos-
sible to stop subsidies to loss-making public enterprises placing a drain
on public spending (a priority of the Bretton Woods organisations)
because where the infrastructures are public, the rates are often too low
to allow the recovery of costs and there are frequent problems with
non-payments. Privatisation was also intended to improve efficiency,
productivity and profitability in the essential services sector by inject-
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ing the rationality and dynamism of the market forces into decision-
making and business management. On the other hand, even where
these services were not privatised, the new public management rules
rely on the principle of total coverage of costs, forcing service providers
to seek a level of income making it possible to cover all their recurrent
costs while devising cost coverage which takes account of future cash
flow requirements. In both cases – privatisation and new public man-
agement – the poorest populations have had to face a substantial
increase in costs and growing problems with access.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the new dominant elites acted as vectors for the
demands of the market forces relating to economic liberalisation and
the opening up of markets which led to a proliferation of private sup-
pliers for essential public services. The funding providers also played an
important role in this sense, by demanding that private financing and
provision be extended to these services, and notably the supply of water
in urban environments. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) drawn up by the WTO also encourages partial privatisation.
In the framework of these agreements, countries must pledge ‘to gradu-
ally raise the level of liberalisation’ and they are encouraged with ever-
increasing urgency to liberalise fresh aspects of service provision.
It is important to recall that the proliferation of public-private partner-
ships is in no sense the logical and inevitable result of the return to the
economic rationality of the market forces. In recent years, they have
been institutionalised, protected and guided by the dominant players in
the framework of the new global architecture in charge of the smooth
running of the globalised economy. The United Nations conference on
development financing in Monterrey and the United Nations world
summit on sustainable development in Johannesburg in 2002 set these
new partnerships at the heart of the transformations in development
co-operation by making them into one of the new outlets offering the
greatest promise in terms of impact on the populations’ living condi-
tions.
The World Bank, in association with other international bodies, has set
in place some innovative mechanisms to ensure a growing role for the
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private sector in the management of essential services. The guarantees
of the World Bank, the International Financial Society and the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency also help governments to
attract private investors in the water and sanitation sectors, thanks to
the reduction of the risks linked to the performance of the govern-
ments. The World Bank also provides loans designed to finance proj-
ects which meet the conditions of privatisation and cost recovery. Such
is the case, for instance, with the project to supply water in Luanda in
Angola, whose objectives are notably to recruit private enterprises to
manage the water distribution system in the major urban centres and to
adopt a charging system allowing the recovery of the costs by the water
distribution company.
This new dominant vision of the management of essential services also
characterises the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)
launched in 2001, which encourages partnerships between the public
sector and the private sector to attract new investments in various
essential sectors, including water. This position indicates a radical
change among the dominant African elites, who are playing the game
of transnationalisation by opening their doors to direct foreign invest-
ment by multinationals and offering them opportunities to make their
capital work for them in new sectors of activity (transport, energy,
water or sanitation).
There are now over 2,350 public-private partnerships in the water and
sanitation sectors, whereas they were virtually non-existent at the
beginning of the 1990s. However, the promotion of the partnerships
and the redefinition of the public-private fields of responsibility do still
pose some problems, because under the guise of improving quality and
access to essential services, these policies have translated into results
which have sometimes been controversial, when they have been associ-
ated with the privatisation of these services. The problem arises when-
ever private companies do not wish to ensure the supply of water in the
countryside or in poorer districts in low-income countries, because they
consider that this activity is not profitable, given the lack of solvent
markets in these zones. For example, in Cartagena in Colombia, a huge
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shanty-town has not been connected to the network because the service
provider took the view that it was not part of the conurbation.
So the results of these partnerships have been patchy, because contrary
to expectation, privatisation has not made it possible to raise the new
capital anticipated, and the new public-private partnerships have not
been able to mobilise these additional resources to improve quality and
access to these essential services. Moreover, the most badly-off are bear-
ing the brunt of the reluctance of the private operators to finance
investments offering a poor return in poorer areas, and have to cope
with the principle of payment for services by customers on which the
public-private partnerships rest. In 2000 in the Bolivian town of
Cochabamba, for example, the price of water rose three to fourfold
within just weeks, after a private London company secured the deal to
supply the town’s water. 
These problems illuminate the limits of the public-private partnerships
if we want to maintain the idea of universal access to these essential
services. An awareness of the risks of the exclusion of the poorer strata
from access to these essential services is at the bottom of the reflection
on the global public goods which are not goods like others and need in
that sense to be provided by mechanisms outside the logic of the mar-
ket or else by modified market mechanisms ensuring that nobody is left
out. The emergence of the idea of corporate social responsibility fol-
lowed the rising tide of anxiety regarding this vast process of the pri-
vatisation of essential services. It means that we are including a new
type of responsibility – social responsibility – and that a company is
also not being considered as an economic entity simply pursuing the
objective of maximising profit, but also just one of many parties
involved in its environment, with a duty to collaborate in the improve-
ment of the living and working conditions of the populations while
preserving its profitability. 
However, one can only be cautious with regard to this a-conflictual and
a-historical vision of the social achievements which focuses on the
purely voluntary and non-binding character of such corporate social
responsibility initiatives, while history shows that they have always
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been the fruit of intense struggles. Corporate social responsibility can-
not take the place of national and international rules and legislation
governing the social and environmental rights at the risk of causing
insecurity in the populations’ living and working conditions. So a
strong public determination is necessary if privatisation is not to occur
at the expense of the poorest. In Bolivia, water and sanitation in La Paz
and El Alto, for example, have been awarded to the bidder which
promised the highest number of connections in the poor districts. 
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Sheet 3: ‘You can’t eat growth’
At the moment, there is a large-scale intellectual counter-offensive
designed to reinforce the mechanism justifying the neoliberal integra-
tion project on the basis of the virtuous progression of liberalisation,
growth and poverty reduction which would justify the prescriptive side
of the dominant discourse and notably the priority accorded to liberali-
sation policies in structural adjustment and development policies. 
In this framework, the slide of development policies towards poverty
reduction policies makes it possible to leave aside any reflection linked
to the question of redistribution and to reaffirm the centrality of the
objective of growth. For the dominant players, the priority is now for
there to be fewer poor people, but more social justice. If, at the same
time, inequalities are reduced, then that is all to the good because it
accelerates the poverty reduction process, but it is not necessary and it
is important to avoid any voluntarist policy in this field which might
jeopardise the conditions of growth.
The fundamental issue in the deconstruction of this work is to look at
the problem of the role of growth in development policies. If the bene-
fits of growth are shared fairly and if growth helps the poor, then a pol-
icy focused on promoting growth can be justified. If, on the other
hand, the poor are excluded from the benefits of growth or receive pro-
portionally fewer benefits, the objective of growth should be reincorpo-
rated into an integrated development strategy, in which growth is an
important aspect but is given no more importance than the creation of
productive jobs, the fairer distribution of income, social protection and
the meeting of basic material and immaterial needs.
In the 1970s, the perception by a whole category of development spe-
cialists that growth had been uneven and had had no effect from the
point of view of improving the lot of the most deprived, translated into
the development of a new school of thought putting forward the idea
of mis-development. This was defined as the outcome of growth by
inequality which had been pursued by most of the countries in the
third world by adopting a copycat path of development compared to
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the one in the countries which are now developed. Rapid growth had
led to the emergence of modern production enclaves delivering a west-
ernised lifestyle and consumption pattern to an elite, with the rest of
the population being pushed to the margins. The consequence was per-
verse growth based on the production of luxury goods for the domestic
market, while the majority of the population had no access to essential
goods, that sector being under-developed for want of solvent demand. 
This realisation was to be behind the proliferation of works in order to
define fresh development strategies designed to improve living and
working conditions for the populations, and first and foremost the
poorest. Under the ILO’s World Employment Programme, extensive
research has been conducted on the basis of field missions to define
strategies oriented towards employment in which employment would
not be a variable depending on the choice of development policies, but
on the contrary, would be at the very centre of the policy formulation
process. It is on the basis of these works that strategies geared towards
‘redistribution with growth’ and ‘essential needs’ will be developed
within the international organisations.
In the 1970s, the radical critics of growth theory also defended the idea
of a greater loosening of the ties between the sphere of accumulation
and the sphere of development, because development seemed to them to
have as its objective not the accumulation of capital, but the satisfaction
of mankind’s basis needs – whether material or immaterial. In the early
1980s with the debt crisis in the South and the neoliberal counter-revo-
lution in the North, the social dimension and the critical reflection on
growth once again virtually vanished from the formulation of develop-
ment policies. The structural adjustment programmes were dominated
by the objectives of macroeconomic rebalancing and microeconomic
transformations in order to create an environment favourable to the
market forces which were now seen as the drivers of growth and a
‘rational’ development path.
During the 1990s, the ideology of growth in the framework of globali-
sation crystallised into the hegemonic reading grid of the restructuring
operations underway at the global level and the associated issues. These
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restructurings of the conditions for accumulation were facilitated by
the dominant discourse which is marked by its very strong functional-
ity vis-à-vis the fresh demands of the capitalist system. Yet the legiti-
macy of this discourse on globalisation and its prescriptive aspect
– structural adjustment programmes seeking to meet the conditions for
advantageous integration into the globalised economy – relies upon the
dynamism of the globalised capitalist economy. 
It is very interesting in this connection to show the spectacular gulf
between the vision of the world disseminated by the elites who favour
the neoliberal globalisation project and the reality of the backward
social phenomena at the global level:
• On the one hand we have the dominant discourse based upon the ideas
of convergence, growth and improvement of the living conditions of
the population via globalisation: ‘Provided that effective political orien-
tations are adopted, there is a strong potential today which leads us to
hope, in decades to come, for significant gains for the ever-growing
numbers of people in the active population at global level. However,
there are no guarantees of this optimistic scenario. If the developing
countries and the industrialising countries do not adopt policies based
upon the market economy, or if the tendency towards the reinforce-
ment of international integration is stopped by protectionist practices,
the decades ahead might indeed be characterised by a downturn in
growth and an increase in inequalities at the global level’.
• On the other hand, we have the recognition – within the United
Nations system itself – of the intensification of poverty, inequalities and
exclusion at global level: the increase in inequalities, the informalisation
of economies, increasingly precarious conditions, the rise in poverty
and the deterioration of the social bond.
Seeing such evidence reinforces the social demands emerging around
the world for the definition of fresh development policies in which the
objective of integration would be subordinated to the objective of
human development. It is crucial for the countries in the South to
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regain control of the speed of integration and the sequences of integra-
tion. Integration must also serve the needs of a project for a democrat-
ically framed society, and not be imposed on societies. The ultimate
test to be passed by all structural adjustment and stabilisation pro-
grammes is that of improving the populations’ living conditions: if a
programme cannot pass this test in reality or on paper, then it is con-
demned and is in need itself of structural adjustment or complete
redefinition. 
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Sheet 4: The arrangements for the financing of development in
the ACP and their limits
Financing development means finding resources able to cover the spending
incurred to this end. ACP development is financed in line with various
arrangements which are:
- International bilateral and multilateral debt;
- National public or private debt;
- Development assistance;
- Transfers of funds by emigrant workers;
- Popular financial systems (informal and local).
Financing development by the ACP’s international multilateral and bilateral debt
- It offsets the inadequacy of national savings capable of supporting the
investments necessary for development.
- It is bilateral where the loan/borrowing contract is between two
States, and multilateral where it is between not just one State and the
international financial institutions (public multilateral), but also,
between the State and the multinational banks (private multilateral).
- The logic of international debt consists in getting a State moved from
a situation of net debtor (owing money to others), towards a situation
of net creditor (the one to whom others owe money), in the hope that
it will have allocated its credits productively.
- This development financing strategy led to the crisis in international
debt in the ACP after an unproductive accumulation of the inter-
national resources in the period 1960-1980.
- The payment of the debt servicing (interest + principal) absorbs a
major part of the resources which the ACP countries could otherwise
have allocated to social investments in things such as hospitals, health-
care, education and so on.
- There is a heterogeneity of debts because there is a heterogeneity of
creditors and a heterogeneity of debtors. This sometimes blocks the
cancellation and rescheduling negotiations.
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- With the public component of the amount of ACP debt being lower
than the private amount, cancellation is not impossible. Its refusal is
simply the absence of a genuine political will on the part of the
public bilateral and multilateral creditors.
- The HIPC (highly-indebted poor countries) initiative is a debt man-
agement mechanism which allows just the indebted countries to gather
together the resources to pay. It handles debt in order to be able to
pay, not to be able to develop.
- It is not the reimbursement of the ACP debt, a short-term objective,
that should shape the development of the ACP, but development, a
long-term objective, that must constrain the reimbursement of the
ACP debts.
- The only solution capable of liberating the development of the ACP is
the unconditional cancellation of their external debts.
- Responsibilities are shared between debtor ACP countries and
their creditors in the process of international debt.
Financing development through national debt in the ACP
- Despite the financial liberalisation measures in the structural adjust-
ment programmes, many ACP countries still have ‘debt economies’. In
other words, economies in which enterprises finance their development
investments via the loans granted by the banking system.
- In sub-Saharan Africa in particular, the national banks have all been
privatised. It is now western banking multinationals that control the
national banking systems.
- The banks are over-liquid and sound since the structural adjustments,
but they still do not grant credits to the national SMEs, but only to
more profitable import/export activities.
- Ordinary people, who have no bank guarantees, are still excluded
from the loans granted by the national banking systems.
- It remains easier to obtain a credit to buy a western car than to
grow bananas, even though these are more useful in terms of local
food self-sufficiency in the ACP.
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- The national banking systems are thus largely outward-looking and
do not finance local development projects but projects which are the
most economically profitable at the international level.
Financing ACP development by popular (informal) financial systems and micro-
finance institutions
- The popular financial system is made up of financial institutions gen-
erally described as ‘informal’ (notably, tontines).
- These tontines have their roots in the distant past and help the popu-
lations in the ACP not just to find the financing for their SMEs, but
also to solve their day-to-day problems (sickness, marriages, mourning,
field work, building a house, etc).
- It is a system that links social concerns to the economic interests of
individual and collective accumulation and operates above all on the
basis of trust and joint guarantees.
- This popular financing system is limited in that it finances only
short-term activities, while development is a long-term process.
- The micro-finance institutions also participate in development financ-
ing, granting small loans to the poor social classes and to small entre-
preneurs.
- However, the reimbursement constraints are very draconian and
sometimes create new forms of poverty which did not exist before
micro-credit.
- The integrated financial system, in other words the system which
does not exclude anybody, promoted by the UN via micro-credit,
sometimes seems to be an instrument for neoliberal development poli-
cies.
- Certain micro-finance institutions try to tip the popular financial sys-
tem off its axis by killing it from within through a raft of copycat finan-
cial practices.
- The micro-finance institutions appear more and more as stages in the
evolution towards conventional banks. This means that the poorest
populations are not reached by them.
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- The activities financed are often microscopic and do not get people
out of poverty.
- Micro-credit sometimes seems to be more of an instrument for social
financialisation than one contributing to the fight against poverty.
Financing ACP development by Official Development Assistance (ODA)
• What is Official Development Assistance (ODA)?
- The developing countries benefit from a host of financial resources of
two categories: official development finance (ODF) and private contri-
butions (investments, loans, export credits). ODF encompasses ODA,
whether bilateral or multilateral. ODA also includes technical assis-
tance, gifts and loans.
- It comes essentially from the industrial countries in the North (donor
countries).
- It has been steadily falling since the 90s and has never reached the
objective of 0.7% of GDP in those countries. This objective has been
set by the United Nations for a number of years already. 
- ODA is neutral in itself, insofar as its positive or negative effects
depend on government policies. The relationship between the posi-
tive effects of the aid and the right internal directives is maintained,
even in the course of adjustment.
• Why this constant erosion of ODA intended for the ACP?
- Most of the donor countries in the North have themselves weathered
an economic crisis and instituted budgetary adjustment measures to cut
public spending. On the basis that charity begins at home, they have
reduced the amount being paid to the developing countries by way of
aid.
- The growing disengagement of what were the biggest donors for sev-
eral years, the United States and Japan.
- The end of the Cold War and the discovery of new partners among
the countries of Eastern Europe.
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- Some donor countries have insisted on the lack of positive results of
aid because of waste and because of funds being misappropriated
by the ACP elites.
- The neoliberal approach of development policies changes the method
of development co-operation between the ACP and the donor coun-
tries. There is thus a shift from a strategy of ‘trade plus aid’ towards a
strategy of ‘trade but no aid’.
- The World Bank is asking more and more for criteria to evaluate the
effectiveness of development assistance.
• Advantages of ODA in financing the development of the
ACP
- A country undergoing a cash flow crisis can succeed in financing
development projects thanks to ODA.
- The ACP countries can benefit from the technical assistance and
training of their nationals in specific areas.
- The beneficiary ACP countries can commit development expenditure
without worrying about the external constraint and their budgetary
balances.
- ODA can stimulate economic growth.
• Drawbacks and limits of ODA in financing the development
of the ACP
- Over a quarter of the bilateral aid is tied. In other words, it is depend-
ent upon the purchase of goods and services from the donor coun-
try. This means that the aid is no longer neutral vis-à-vis the external
balance of the beneficiary country
- Tied aid is perceived as ungenerous and opportunist on the part of
the donor countries which find in it a way of defending their eco-
nomic, commercial, political or security interests.
- Tied aid leads to a selection of projects with a strong element of
imports which do not appear as a priority for the development of
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the beneficiary countries and have a negative effect on their trade
balances.
- Tied aid blocks competition and leads to added costs in certain
development sectors by monopolies which the donors create for them-
selves there.
- Aid is not an effective instrument in the fight against poverty in the
very poor countries.
- No country in the world has developed with international aid but
by the mobilisation of internal savings.
- Aid sometimes even develops a link of dependency and assistance in
the beneficiary countries.
• What to do in order to benefit from ODA in financing the
development of the ACP?
- The beneficiary countries need to have precise development objec-
tives to which to assign the ODA resources.
- The beneficiary countries need to set in place sound management of
the aid resources. This implies socio-economic stability, a lack of cor-
ruption and misappropriation and the presence of the rule of law.
- The Non-State Actors (NSAs) in the ACP need to be involved in the
definition of the development objectives and the management of the
international aid resources.
- The beneficiary ACP countries need to be able to adopt long-term
visions and to trust the ‘civil society’ to create ‘substitute institutions’
to replace those forming part of a State bureaucracy whose manage-
ment of ODA is not always transparent.
- The donor countries need to limit tied aid packages and to adopt an
attitude of complementarity between them, not one of competition.
- Aid packages need to create knowledge and reinforce skills and
autonomy, rather than simply spending money.
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Financing the development of the ACP through transfers of money by emigrant
workers
- Globalisation is marginalizing the countries of the South in general
and the ACP in particular. Aside from integration into world trade
thanks to income from oil, it is thanks to the links that migrants main-
tain with their home countries that many ACP countries continue to
hold on to a position in the world economy despite the current restric-
tions on migrations.
- Transfers in the form of savings by emigrant workers represent sub-
stantial and stable contributions for several ACP countries at a time
when income from public and private capital is fluctuating or even neg-
ative.
- Official development assistance has been in freefall since the 1990s,
while transfers of funds from emigrant workers are very dynamic.
- Transfers of funds from migrants have become as important as
transfers going via foreign direct investment (FDI) and far outstrip
Official Development Assistance (ODA)13.
- Transfers not going via the informal networks are extremely highly
taxed, notably by Western Union, which makes a financial profit on
the back of the emigrant workers.
- Certain analyses into the effects of transfers of funds by emigrant
workers see them as a godsend which will make it possible to get devel-
opment under way; others point to the dependency effects.
- The families of emigrant workers can fall into a mindset of consump-
tion to the detriment of accumulation.
- A beneficial effect of the income from the funds may be offset by a
negative effect translating into a situation of rent, favouring demand
for imports over local production. 
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13. See El Mouhoud
Mouhoud, 2006,
‘Migrations interna-
tionales, mondiali-
sation et développe-
ment’, La lettre de la
régulation, n° 55,
pp.1-5.
Sheet 5: The issues of regional integration, industrialisation and
liberalisation of trade and capital movements in the ACP
What are the links between regional integration, capital movements,
industrialisation and the liberalisation of trade?
- Regional integration makes it easier to establish the liberalisation of
trade by creating regional markets interacting with each other and with
the rest of the world.
- Regional integration thus allows countries setting it up to gain better
control over the liberalisation of trade and to impose a precise profile
of industrialisation and development on the rest of the world.
- The liberalisation of trade favours the international capital move-
ments necessary for the financing of regional and national industrialisa-
tion.
- Regional integration, the liberalisation of trade and industrialisation
are thus interdependent and mutually reinforce each other.
The issues of regional integration in the ACP
- Regional integration is an incarnation of the slogan of ‘Strength
through unity’.
- It is easier and more credible for an ACP country to co-operate and
negotiate with the EU through a region to which it belongs than in iso-
lation.
- Regional integration can deliver the expected synergy effects only if
the countries which constitute it: 
a) are stable in social, political and economic terms;
b) establish the rule of law;
c) relinquish part of their sovereignty in certain areas in favour of the
regional institutions;
and
d) if the regions have an agency to monitor the application of the meas-
ures taken by the economic and political union.
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- In the case of the ACP countries, such monitoring agencies do not
exist. This role is played by certain EU bodies as part of EU/ACP co-
operation.
- The pace of regional integration needs to be tailored to the prob-
lems and the timetable of the countries setting it up. This condition
is not complied with in many ACP regions, where it is the EPAs that
lay down the timetable for regional integrations without taking into
account either the specific features of the sub-regional institutional
processes or their own rhythms.
- Regional integration of the ACP countries must be an instrument
not simply for free trade, but also for the promotion of the rule of
law and social development.
- The political and social stability of a region is very important in
terms of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), hence the impor-
tance of first putting a stop to many armed conflicts in many ACP
countries if there is to be any hope of positive effects from regional
integration.
- Regional integration cannot single-handedly change the narrow pro-
duction structures of the ACP, let alone their method of integration
into the international market by cash and primary specialisation.
- The success of regional integration also requires the development of
regional communications (roads, railways, air transport, telephone,
internet).
The issues of international capital movements in the ACP
- The liberalisation of trade goes hand in hand with the liberalisation of
international capital movements.
- There are two sorts of capital movements:
a) Floating capital is purely speculative. It has no productive effect on
the countries receiving it. It may even lead to inflationary pressures
which erode workers’ purchasing power. 
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b) Capital movements generated by foreign direct investment
(FDI), on the other hand, lead to genuine investments which can
improve employment and growth within a country.
- FDI to most of the ACP is very low because of social and political
instability; the absence of the rule of law; failure to abide by property
rights; the concentration of the international capital movements within
the industrial countries with the same levels of development. 
- FDI can chip away at the sovereignty of the ACP in many sectors
and start a struggle against poverty when they translate not into supple-
mentary socio-economic development, but into the purchasing of the
socially strategic public enterprises (water, electricity, healthcare,
education).
- It is very dangerous for a country’s development policy to be based on
external capital because everything may collapse the minute it leaves
the country or the region.
The issues of industrialisation and the liberalisation of trade in the ACP
- FDI, regional integration and the liberalisation of trade between the
ACP and the rest of the world are supports for their industrialisation.
The point is that FDI represents a financing resource, and the liberali-
sation of trade makes these resources available within the regions which
can be their landing places.
- The ACP and their regions need a certain level of industrialisation to
solve their dependency problems vis-à-vis manufactured and indus-
trial products from the EU.
- Industrialisation can offer a solution to many problems in the field of
the transformation of local resources (wood, minerals, etc), and in the
health sector (hospital equipment, medical research tools, treatment
methods, epidemiological analysis laboratories, etc).
- Many co-called industrialised countries have successfully industri-
alised themselves by relying on the development of the production of
labour-intensive goods.
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- The principle of reciprocity set up by the EPAs seems to block off
the real possibilities for the industrialisation of the ACP. The point
is that reciprocal opening up of markets between the EU and the
ACP means that European industrial products will be competing
with the emerging ACP industry, which will not have the time to
develop.
- Regional integration and the setting in place of EPAs must be accom-
panied by a demand for measures to protect the nascent ACP indus-
tries, which are unable to cope with competition from the EU
industrial sector. How can this be done with liberalisation measures
all over the place?
- The EPAs must ensure that they do not confuse industrialisation
and development. It is possible to have industrialisation without
development, when the latter leads to major social polarisation and the
destruction of historical social security institutions.
- Industrialisation which translates into the setting up of a productive
structure that is more capital-intensive where the ACP countries
are more labour-intensive would be a social catastrophe in the
sense that it would translate into an increase in unemployment and
the reinforcement of a two-track productive system.
- Industrialisation is useful and necessary only if it delivers socio-eco-
nomic well-being in the ACP countries.
What are the lessons to be learned from the past industrial experiences 
of the ACP?
- After independence, the voluntarist industrialisation policy of the
ACP based on capital-intensive heavy industry (iron and steel, engi-
neering, electrical construction, chemicals, energy production, etc) suf-
fered a crippling failure.
- As in the past, the agro-industrial complexes must not simply
over-exploit the local mining resources and the farmers.
- Industrialisation which aims at local transformation of mining and
forestry resources is of more use to development than an a purely
extractive industry geared to the export of cash products.
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- The industrialisation of the ACP must not perpetuate the primary
specialisation as was the case after independence.
- Industrialisation must not bring with it a drop in the production
of domestic consumption products in favour of export products.
This would lead to the ACP countries becoming dependent for food,
and the destruction of the national and regional markets to the benefit
of the international market.
- Industrialisation must allow a way out of the old vicious circle: ‘to
diversify exports or angle their production to external markets, the
ACP countries would need to industrialise, therefore to import
equipment goods, therefore to have currency reserves, which would
force them to try to maintain a sufficient level of income from
exports, and therefore to pursue the primary specialisation’.
- The linkages between town/country and modern/traditional sectors
must not be analysed, as they were in the past, in terms of traditional
forms to combat and modern forms to promote, but more in terms
of synergies and complementarity. This involves taking account of
the complementarities and interdependencies between sectors, territo-
ries, their activities and their players.
- The national reports have shown that the primary sector was mobilis-
ing the bulk of the active population, but was participating less in the
formation of the value added than the tertiary sector. The choice of
the sectors towards which to target FDI and industrialisation is
thus a key question given the scarcity of resources available. These
choices must determine the development sequences and the linkages
between territories, players and activities to be deployed. Which social
classes and activities will be sacrificed or reformed at each stage in the
industrialisation process? 
- The technological choices and ways of organising labour depend
on these sectoral choices, the international setting, the level of employ-
ment and the structure of the active population (men/women, younger
people/adults, skilled/unskilled, villagers/town-dwellers, etc).
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- The ‘turnkey industries’ strategy sets in place industrial mimetism
of which the major consequences are the non-development of local
engineering and genuine technological learning. It fosters techno-
logical dependency and not the national integration of an indus-
trial fabric.
- Industrialisation is not a neutral technical process vis-à-vis the
social field. It affects the nature and the state of social relation-
ships. This is why it is important to discover the most effective
ways to develop it in the ACP without ‘social casualties’.
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Sheet 6: Determining factors and consequences of migratory
movements between the EU and the ACP countries
Some general information
- Aside from involuntary migrations (as a result of wars, slavery, natural
catastrophes, mobilisations, etc) and luxury migrations (tourism, a taste
for seeing new places), individuals and populations have always moved
from one territory to another in a bid to improve their living conditions.
- Knowing the determining factors in the migratory ebb and flow
makes it possible to act not on the consequences, but on the causes of
this phenomenon which occupies development policies and the nature
of North-South relations.
- Migratory movements are part and parcel of the process of develop-
ment insofar as they foster contacts between populations and their
practices, territories and living conditions.
- In an age of globalisation, the mobility of populations from one
country to another can be equally a factor for integration or proof
of instability and precarious conditions.
- The poor countries send fewer migrants than the countries with
intermediate incomes, but proportionally more very well-qualified
migrants.
- Asia, and to a lesser extent Europe and Africa, are the main regions
from which the qualified migrants come (see table 1).
- There is no real substitution between migrations and interna-
tional trade as claimed by the standard theory of international trade.
- Illegal immigration causes many human problems for the nation-
als of the ACP [detention centres, refugee centres, people with no
papers, forced repatriations, modern forms of slavery (prostitution,
exploitation of illegal workers, etc)].
- EU immigration policy is slacker in times of strong economic growth
than in times of recession, when the immigrant becomes ‘the hell of
other people’.
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Table 1: Breakdown of qualified migrants by zone of origin (as a total % of
graduate migrants)
Sources: Dumont (J.C) and Lemaître (G.), 2005, ‘Beyond the Headlines. New Evidence on the Brain Drain, Revue
Economique, n° 6. Docquier and Alii, 2005, ‘Union Européenne et migrations internationales: l’UE (15) contribue t-elle à l’ex-
ode des travailleurs qualifiés?’ Revue Economique, special issue, ‘ Localisation, migration, institutions’, n° 6.
The socio-historical and economic determining factors in the ebb and flows 
of migrants between country of emigration (country left) and country of
immigration (country of settlement)
a) The social and historical determining factors
- EU/ACP relations show that colonial history plays a central role in
the current migratory movements.
- During the colonial period, the old colonial powers in the EU
were emigration countries, while the ACP were immigration coun-
tries. The explorers and the colonists set out from countries in Europe
(England, France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Italy), and settled in
many ACP, which at the time were colonies.
- The decolonisation movement reversed this trend. Many European
citizens and their local connections returned to Europe when efforts to
cope with the struggles for independence in the colonies turned violent
and damaging. The ACP colonies turned into emigration countries
and the European countries into immigration countries.
- The period of independence enshrined several failures in the ACP
development process. Local living conditions deteriorated in the ACP,
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REGIONS PERCENTAGES (%)
Asia 32
EU (25) 26
Africa 9
South and Central America 5
North America 5
OECD 40
forcing their populations to leave for the countries of Europe: these
failures were:
* A conception of development presenting modern commodities
and western symbolic, behavioural, spiritual and material
references as being ‘heaven on earth’;
* Structural adjustments are draconian measures leading to a rise
in unemployment, precarious conditions and poverty in both
rural and urban areas in the ACP;
* The absence of the rule of law in many ACP;
* The lack of economic fairness and equity between the EU
and the ACP destroys the local markets and impoverishes
several social classes. The point is that many stock breeders in
the ACP are being submerged under a tide of subsidised
chickens from the EU; fishermen in the ACP countries are
falling victim to illegal industrial fishing by EU fishing boats;
farmers in the ACP countries are victims of EU subsidies under
the common agricultural policy.
b) The economic determinants
- Some economists say that what drives someone to leave his or her vil-
lage for the city at the national level, or to move from one country to
another in international terms, is the level of wages hoped for, given
the greater likelihood of finding a job in the town or in the host
country than in the village or the home country.
- Other economists also say that people migrate because they want to
reduce their relative privation. In other words, they want to reduce
the privation in terms of goods, services and leisure that they are suffer-
ing because they have a very low income or even nothing at all com-
pared to people in other social groups which they take for reference
purposes.
- Other economic analyses show that migration organised individually
corresponds to increased risks in the life of the migrant, whereas migra-
tion organised by a network of migrants or by the whole family, cor-
responds to a diversification of the risks which is more reassuring for
the migrant.
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The consequences of contemporary migratory movements in the departure
countries (ACP) and the host countries (EU)
- Migration corresponds to destruction of one’s social capital (one’s
relationships and social acquaintances in the departure country), in the
search to construct another one in the host country.
- Migrations play a positive role in the annual growth of the total popu-
lation of several OECD countries, and participate in the natural pop-
ulation growth (surplus of births over deaths), with incomers’ fertility
being higher than that of the nationals.
- Transfers of funds by emigrant workers finance development in the
ACP (Jamaica, Haiti, Barbados, Dominican Republic, sub-Saharan
Africa, etc).
- The host countries benefit from the arrival of highly qualified and
unskilled labour, which is needed in the two extreme segments of their
labour markets.
- The departure countries lose a workforce in the agricultural sector,
because those who leave are generally young men and young women.
- The brain drain is not always negative for the departure countries,
even if the benefits are largely to the good of the EU countries.
* One first positive effect may be linked to the unblocking of the
labour market in the country of origin, where rates of graduate
employment are very low;
* The rise in the knowledge economy in the OECD attracts highly
qualified populations from the ACP;
* Graduates from the ACP are rarely employed at the level to
which they are qualified in the EU countries.
What about immigration policy between the EU and the ACP?
- The prime goal of an immigration policy is not to achieve the impos-
sible by wishing to put a complete stop to all people emigrating from
the ACP to the EU, but to make sure that the migratory flows are
channelled better and made more secure in a spirit of co-operation
and consultation.
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- Current EU immigration policy, which consists of training border
guards and financing detention centres in transit countries such as
Libya, Senegal and Morocco, is totally ineffective. It means passing
the buck to these transit countries without being able to stem the
flow of migrants.
- It is only if there is development in the ACP countries from which
people are departing that their populations can be encouraged ‘to
dream their dreams at home’ and stop migrating to the EU. This
implies:
* Improving living conditions in the rural zones so as to reduce
migrations from the countryside to the towns in the ACP;
* Improving urban living conditions so as to reduce international
migrations from towns in the ACP to towns in the EU;
* Promoting the construction of the rule of law in the ACP in
order to remove the reasons for migrations on political and ideo-
logical grounds.
- Better distribution of the benefits of the emigration of skills
could be achieved if five principles were applied 14:
* The principle of effectiveness consisting of creating a passport
offering free movement of these skills in order to avoid the lock-
in effects associated with irreversible policies on aid on return;
* The principle of equity would seek to better share out the costs
associated with mobility between all the players, by developing
the education sector and helping students;
* The principle of sustainability would mean that in the long
term, the benefits for the departure countries depend on the
institutions in the country of origin, in particular in terms of the
management of their human resources;
* The principle of ethics would define the rights and duties of
each of the players;
* The principle of responsibility would protect immigrant work-
ers and illegal workers already in EU countries.
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14. See Dumont (J.C.),
2006, ‘Les migrations
internationales de
travailleurs qualifiés.
Des Bénéfices à
partager’, in Mouhoud
(direc.), Les nouvelles
Migrations, Universalis.
Diagram 1: Causes, consequences and interdependencies between internal and
international migrations 15
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15. Author’s conception. Migrations do not always give rise to negative
consequences, so we are focusing here on migrations driven by precarious
conditions and illegal international immigration.
Deteriorating rural living and working conditions 
in the ACP
Hopes for better living conditions in the towns in the ACP 
> Flight from the land
Urban disillusionment (urban unemployment, famine, 
housing shortages, drugs, delinquency, prison, 
social exclusion, increasingly precarious conditions)
Hopes for better living conditions in Europe in particular 
and in the West in general
Causes of international
migrations
International migrations to Europe and the West 
in general 
Western disillusionment (people with no papers, illegal 
networks, detention centres, repatriations, prisons, modern
forms of slavery (underground economy, prostitution, etc)
Death or life under cover/chronic instability of life 
for an ACP migrant 
National migratory
dynamic in the ACP
International migratory
dynamic between 
the ACP and the EU
Sheet 7: Evaluation of the major trends in the socio-economic and
democratic transformations at the regional level
The purpose of this sheet is to offer a succinct summary of the situa-
tion in the ACP in macroeconomic terms and in terms of access to
essential goods and services, regional integration, democracy and sound
governance. The information given below comes from national reports
drawn up on the basis of a trade union questionnaire for the purposes
of this project to boost the abilities of the trade union organisations.
The macroeconomic indicators, the production structures and the specialisations
in the ACP and their regions
All the regions demonstrate the same characteristics at the macroeco-
nomic level, and in terms of specialisation and the nature of the pro-
duction structures, as may be seen from Table 2.
Table 2: General characteristics of the economies of all the ACP countries 16
90
16. Author’s conception.
Nature 
of the 
economy
Orientation 
of the 
economy
Nature of the
link vis-à-vis
the EU
Nature 
of the
specialisation
Characteristic
of the growth
pattern
- rentier;
- very extensive
informal
sector;
- very narrow
production
base.
- largely
outward-
looking
economy.
- colonial
division of
labour
(suppliers of
raw materials);
- significant
external
dependence.
- primary
specialisation;
- industrial
sector very
poorly
developed.
- growth pattern
very unstable
because
economies
operate on
rentier basis,
are outward-
looking and
dependent.
The WAEMU (the West African Economic and Monetary Union)
- Serious instability in the growth rates in several countries, Table 3
shows that the WAEMU has been posting positive growth rates since
2000. While these growth rates cannot be attributed solely to the
effects of the Cotonou Agreement at the individual level, still less is this
the case at the sub-regional level.
- In terms of production structures, of the contribution made by differ-
ent sectors to the creation of value added and of the percentage of the
active population per sector, the economies in the WAEMU zone are
still very poorly diversified, are outward-looking and are heavily
dependent on primary agricultural products, with very low demand
price elasticity (see Table 4).
- The greater contribution of the tertiary sector compared to the sec-
ondary sector in the formation of value added (32% against 23% in
Togo, 47% against 22% in Burkina Faso, 50% against 17% in Guinea
and 44.5% against 24% in Senegal) is evidence that the WAEMU
economies are still little industrialised and process very little locally.
- The division of labour set in place by the colonial pact is thus being per-
petuated, and continues to force the countries in this zone into widely
substitutable productions where they have control neither over the sup-
ply (climatic vagaries, parasites) nor over the international demand.
- The SYSMIN and STABEX instituted by the Lomé Convention to
correct this aspect of things have been no more successful in doing so
than the Structural Adjustment Policies and the current Cotonou
Agreement. The production structures constructed in the long term
following historical trajectories remain stable compared to the short-
term political measures put forward by the SAP to sort out the
economies and kick-start growth.
- It might be more effective not just to draw simply on co-ordination of
the market, but also on age-old local institutions which have proved
their worth in resolving certain local problems encountered by the
players. This is all the more important when farming is the sector play-
ing the greatest role in the employment of the active population in the
countries in the zone.
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- Successfully forging an alliance between the traditional system based
on a combination of mixed farming/stock breeding and certain modern
farming methods might be of more use to these countries in terms of
food self-sufficiency, a necessary precondition for any social autonomy
and for any stable and solid economic development.
Table 3: Some macroeconomic indicators on the WAEMU countries
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Sources: National reports – Senegal, Togo, Benin and Burkina Faso, 2005
Country Years
Real GDP 
per capita
Real GDP 
(in millions)
Growth rate 
of GDP
BURKINA
FASO (in $)
2003 n/a n/a 6,5%
2004 280 (on average) n/a 4%
BENIN 
(in Euro)
2000 378,1 n/a 2%
2001 n/a n/a 6%
2004 419,2 n/a n/a
2005 n/a n/a 3%
TOGO 
(in $)
2000 n/a n/a n/a
2001 n/a n/a n/a
2002 n/a n/a 4,5%
2003 n/a n/a 4,5%
SENEGAL 
(in  $)
2000 617 5795 5,6%
2001 637 6117 5,6%
2002 629 6185 1,1%
2003 640 6422 6,3%
Table 4: Relative economic weighting of different production sectors (WAEMU)
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Sources: National reports - Senegal, Togo, Benin and Burkina Faso, 2005
Country 
(reference year)
Sectors
Percentage of the
active population
per sector
Weighting of the 
sectors in the
national economy
BENIN
Primary (agriculture,
breeding, fishing, mines, etc)
55% 34 to 36 % of GDP
Secondary (industry,
energy, etc)
n/a
Tertiary (trade,
administration, services)
n/a 30 to 35 % of GDP
TOGO 
(2003 and 2004)
Primary (agriculture,
breeding, fishing, mines, etc)
67% (2004) 45% of GDP (2003) and 48% (2004)
Secondary (industry,
energy, etc)
n/a 23% of GDP (2003) and 25% (2004)
Tertiary (trade,
administration, services)
n/a 32% of GDP (2003)
BURKINA FASO
(2003)
Primary (agriculture,
breeding, fishing, mines, etc)
80 to 90% 31% of GDP
Secondary (industry,
energy, etc)
n/a 22% of GDP
Tertiary (trade,
administration, services)
n/a 47% of GDP
GUINEA
Primary (agriculture,
breeding, fishing, mines, etc)
n/a 18% of GDP (lessthan 1% for fishing)
Secondary (industry,
energy, etc)
n/a 17% of GDP
Tertiary (trade,
administration, services)
n/a 50% of GDP
SENEGAL
Primary (agriculture,
breeding, fishing, mines, etc)
over 50% 21% of GDP
Secondary (industry,
energy, etc)
n/a 50% of GDP
Tertiary (trade,
administration, services)
n/a 21% of GDP
The CEMAC
- The trends highlighted by the economic aggregates in Table 5 are the
consequences of a set of factors inextricably linked to the structures of
the national economies, the international economic climate, the inter-
nal political and social situation, the SAPs, the Cotonou Agreement
and other, older, internal political and economic characteristics. So it
would be better to look at them in that light, rather than as direct and
unique effects of the Cotonou Agreement. 
- Moreover, the economies of Central Africa therefore have an
extremely limited production base, like those in West Africa. Mining
and agricultural cash crops are predominant here, once again under-
scoring the rentier economy. The result is serious dependency vis-à-vis
external demand of which the instability, coupled with the instability of
international prices, weakens the national growth schemes (see Table 5). 
- External factors such as the world prices of primary products, climate,
parity between the euro and the dollar, substitutes to exported prod-
ucts, international demand and the local political situation make these
economies very vulnerable and unstable. For example, the revival of
growth in the Central African Republic in 2004, following the rapid
drop of 7.7% in 2003, did not result from the dynamic nature of the
local economy but rather purely from the increase in the world prices
of diamonds and lumber. This is also the case for Burundi’s economy,
which is heavily dependent on the success of its exports of arabica cof-
fee and tea. As for Gabon, its economy has also been going through a
critical period since 1998 because of the sharp decline in oil production
and export of 11.9%. Hence the cyclical economic crises which are very
often caused by the same factors.
- The point is that, confined in an international division of labour
whose distant historical roots stretch back to the colonial period, the
level of diversification is very low and economic specialisation is exclu-
sively rentier in nature. Such is the case with the Central African
Republic, where the 1.2% growth rate recorded in 2004 is due entirely
to an upturn in exports of diamonds (400,000 carats/year on average)
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and lumber (between 500,000 and 800,000 m3/year). Gabon, which is
one of the largest oil producers in the area, is the most typical case of a
cash economy. Between 1990 and 2002 Gabon’s economy was strongly
based on mining and exporting crude oil (30% of GDP and almost
70% of total state income). Therefore, an 11.9% reduction in the min-
ing and exporting of oil led to a 9.6% reduction in Gabon’s GDP in
1999. This dependency on oil is so great that the country ultimately
falls victim to it.
Table 5: Growth rate of GDP in Central Africa
Source: National reports – Central African Republic, Burundi, Gabon and DRC, 2005
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Country Years Growth rate 
GABON
2000 -1,9%
2001 2%
2002 -0,3%
2003 2,1%
2004 1,4%
2005 2,2%
CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC 
2000 0,9%
2003 -7,7%
2004 1,2%
BURUNDI
2000 -0,9%
2001 2,1%
2002 4,5%
2003 -1,2%
2004 4,8%
2005 5% (estimated)
DRC
2001 -2,1%
2002 3,5%
2003 5,7%
2004 6,8%
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA, SADC)
- Aside from South Africa, which is now rated as among the emerging
countries, the economic characteristics of the other countries in this
region are almost the same as those of the ECOWAS and CEMAC: in
other words, primary specialisation; productive rentier systems with lit-
tle diversification; a pattern of complementarity in exchanges with the
rest of the world, unstable growth rates which depend heavily on exter-
nal factors (exchange terms, climate, conditions in the raw materials
markets, etc).
The Caribbean and Pacific countries
- The Dominican Republic, in the Pacific Region, has an economy
which is doing quite well. The dynamism of its national production is
due to the reinforcement of macroeconomic stability which is reflected
in factors such as price stability through stability in the exchange rate,
the slowing down of inflation and a sustained reduction in interest
rates. GDP thus rose by 7.3% between January and September 2005.
This bears witness to the consolidation of the relaunch process initiated
one year earlier. The other factors accounting for this recovery are cur-
rency from the tourism sector, transfers of funds from Dominicans
abroad, and its free zones which include 500 enterprises and employ
7% of the active population.
- In the Caribbean Region, Barbados is witnessing an economic upturn
following the recession of 1991/1992. The period between 1993 and
2000 was the longest phase of expansion ever recorded by the country
since independence. The average growth rate of GDP is 2.8% per year.
Inflation during the same period was 1.7%, whereas it had risen to 5.7%
in 1997 following the introduction of value-added tax (VAT). Economic
activity declined in 2001, when the country registered a reduction of
about 2.8% in the growth rate of GDP. The recession affected the sugar
and non-sugar agricultural sector, tourism (drop of 5.9%), international
trade and financial services. The economy got back on track in 2002
and still relies heavily on tourism (7.7% increase), construction (2.9%
96
increase), transport and communications. Table 6 gives some indicators
of this upturn in growth.
Table 6: Growth rate of Barbados
Source: National report – Barbados, 2005
- Although unemployment was running at 11% in 2003, the upturn in
2002 caused it to fall to 9.8% in 2004 and to 9.5% by the end of 2005.
Inflation remains at 2.5%. This is a rare example of growth leading
to lower unemployment. In other words moving in the opposite direc-
tion. The fact that the territory is a small island with a total population
of under 300,000 people explains this positive link between higher
growth and employment. Adult literacy is 97%.
- Elsewhere in the Caribbean, Grenada’s economic activity fell by 3.8%
in 2001 and 1.1% in 2002. These poor performances can be attributed
to the decrease in farm production and activity in manufacturing, con-
struction and restaurants. This downwards trend was reversed in 2003
when real GDP increased by 5.7% when tourist activity picked up
again. But then Grenada was hit by hurricane Ivan in 2004 which
caused damage equal to 200% of GDP. This resulted in a 4% reduction
in economic activity and the restaurant/hotel sector saw a 25% reduc-
tion in activity.
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Periods or year Growth rate
2002-2003 2,3%
2004 4,8%
2005 4,1%
2006 4% (estimated)
Table 7: Some growth rates in the Caribbean and Pacific regions
Source: National reports – Kiribati, Vanuatu and Fiji, 2005
Links between economic growth, poverty and access to basic services
With very few exceptions, growth does not bring a reduction in unem-
ployment and an improvement to living conditions in the ACP.
ECOWAS and CEMAC
- No concrete links between economic growth and improved living
conditions for the populations through the creation of additional jobs
and an increase in national wealth.
- Accordingly, access to essential services (water, electricity, housing,
education, healthcare, etc) depending largely on purchasing power in a
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Country Years GDP growth rate
VANUATU
1997 6,0%
1998 0%
1999 0%
2001 -2,7%
2002 -4,9%
2003 2,9%
KIRIBATI
1995 3,5%
1996 4,3%
1997 1,0%
1998 7,3%
1999 2,3%
2000 -4,0%
2001 2,0%
FIJI
2000 -2,8%
2001 2,7%
2002 4,35%
2003 3,0%
2004 4,1%
2005 1,7%
context where privatisations continue, does not improve at all. The
people in Benin were so aware of this that they created the popular slo-
gan: ‘La croissance; ça ne se mange pas!’ (‘You can’t eat growth!’).
Hence the reason why there is such a huge discrepancy between meet-
ing the needs of the people and the positive image presented by the
macroeconomic indicators in Table 3. 
- The socio-professional category of the head of the family (apprentice,
family helper, self-employed, not in active employment, unemployed and
so on) has a major impact on poverty in both rural and urban areas. 
- A positive correlation seems to exist between urbanisation and unem-
ployment. In fact, according to the ILO unemployment is a purely
urban phenomenon.
- The lack of links between growth and improved social well-being
seems to prove that development does not come solely from the prac-
tices introduced by the decisions taken by the national and interna-
tional systems. It might be better to improve the understanding of a set
of practices and institutions thanks to which the populations succeed in
living on less than one dollar a day. Improving these types of institu-
tions and practices without neglecting the big system projects might be
a development strategy capable of reaching the populations more
directly in their everyday living conditions. This is all the more impor-
tant for the fact that the analysis of the WAEMU reports shows that the
boom in the informal sector increases with urbanisation, and seems to
be the sector which means that the villages in this region show less
exclusion following the rise in urban unemployment.
- The sexual structure of urban unemployment is important and skewed
towards men. 
- The greater poverty that the reports show in rural areas while unem-
ployment there is marginal might be the result of a link between
towns/rural areas which destructures the latter through the knock-on
effects of the rise in the cost of urban living and its purely monetary
evaluation. In that case, the high rural poverty referred to in the Guinea
report when unemployment there is the exception might be described
as integrated poverty in the sense given to it by Serge Paugam (2005)17.
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17. PAUGAM (S.),
2005, Les formes élé-
mentaires de la pau-
vreté, PUF, Paris.
In other words, a configuration where those that we call the ‘poor’ are
numerous and do not stand out from the other strata in the popula-
tion. The issue is to establish whether, with such homogeneity in terms
of status and socio-economic factors, it might not be better to refer to
destructured lifestyles rather than poverty.
- These results are hardly surprising if we take a close look at Table 4. In
fact, it is not just that the structural adjustments are still being made in
the WAEMU countries and that they are imposing restrictive monetary
and budgetary policies, but also the fact that it is not the primary sector
– the largest provider of jobs in these countries – that is the driver of
the growth. Instead, it is mainly the tertiary sector, which employs a
small proportion of the population, that plays this role.
- The fact that results in expanding economies such as those in the
WAEMU area in terms of well-being, the struggle against poverty and
access to essential goods and services are rickety and patchy raises the
general and recurrent problem of the link between economic growth
and development. The positive character of the macroeconomic growth
indicators does not transfer to the living conditions of the populations.
Quite obviously, economic growth, although it is a factor to be taken
into account in this process, does not belong at the very heart of all the
concerns of a social system. In the case at issue, it seems to be less a fac-
tor for social well-being in these countries than just the result of a
mechanical and productivist organisation of the national institutional
pillars adapted progressively to the logic of the market.
- Hence the need to question the links between the ideas of growth
(dynamics of the productive activities) and wealth (the problem of dis-
tribution and use) at national and international level, in order to
understand why the WAEMU are experiencing growth without wealth.
- Research needs to go into more detail within the informal sector
which, according to all the national reports, is the one creating the
most jobs.
- Aside from the Central African Republic and Congo, where the
economies are barely emerging out of a situation of total ruin after
countless years of war, and where extenuating circumstances may be
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granted to the non-existence of the positive link between growth and
improved social well-being, Gabon and Burundi also demonstrate the
effective non-existence of this link. 
- This is a situation which leads neither to reduced poverty, nor to the
creation of jobs, let alone improvements to the population’s access to
essential goods and services in the CEMAC. This situation is also the
result of a combination of political and economic causes, some of them
extremely distant, and others linked to the mismatch between the good
results of a simple economic mechanism organised to produce them,
and the social situation of the populations.
East Africa and Southern Africa (COMESA, SADC)
- Aside from South Africa, where economic dynamism and the setting
up of the Black Empowerment programme are helping to integrate the
black populations into the world of business, growth does not bring the
creation of additional jobs and a reduction in poverty in the other
countries in the region.
- In some countries (Burundi, for example), young unemployed people
are joining the armed militias which formed during the years of civil
war. So there is growth without enrichment of the populations, because
the country is recording a drop in income per capita following the
combined effects of a high rate of population growth and a drop in the
nominal value of GDP. According to the French Economic Mission,
the number of people living below the poverty line rose from 35% in
1990 to 70% in 2004 although growth was 4.8%.
Democracy and good governance in the ACP
- Substantial progress, although much still remains to be done.
ECOWAS
- Despite a few positive points on the democratisation front, the
ECOWAS still shows poor changeovers in power and more rapid liber-
alisation of economic life than of political life. 
101
- The lack of changeover in power (as in Burkina Faso) or its very low
occurrence (as in Benin and Senegal) is another characteristic of African
democratic processes where hegemonic, vote-catching networks 18 lock off
access to power by relying on powerful social players whose role is to
work to maintain the status quo. The countries thus experience not
successions of different regimes, but a generational reproduction of the
same regimes already in place when the single party system was in
force 19. Hence the frequent use of the politico-economic cycle which con-
sists of taking some positive, popular decisions just ahead of the elec-
tions, so as to capitalise on the electorate’s generally poor memory.
Moreover, with the SAPs still in force, the international legitimacy that
they confer on the African leaders and governments which apply them
means that the economic sphere is very often liberalised more quickly
than the political sphere. Democracy thus tends to be converted into a
simple instrument to promote economic individualism and the con-
quest of international legitimacy, without realising the social promo-
tion which is its prime objective. When democracy becomes simply an
end in itself, rather than a means for action, it is no surprise if access to
essential goods and services remains mediocre.
CEMAC
- Despite some positive signs to be encouraged, democracy and good
governance remain very fragile in countries which are barely recovering
from deep conflicts, such as Burundi, the CAR and the DRC.
- The national reports highlight some positive efforts to respect politi-
cal freedoms, even though much still remains to be done.
- The parties in power remain largely dominant and firmly embedded
in powerful networks maintaining the status quo at the head of the
countries. Good governance automatically suffers as a result, because
the vote-catching networks operate in shadowy ways by redistributing
payments to the power supports. 
- Moreover, the neo-patrimonial character of the States means that every
political official tends to take his slice of the national cake wherever he
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L’Etat importé.
L’occidentalisation de
l’ordre politique,
Fayard, Paris. BAYARD
(J.F.), 1989, L’Etat en
Afrique. La politique
du ventre, Fayard,
Paris.
19. AMOUGOU (T.)
and NGO NYEMB
(M.), 2005, idem.
may be and whatever he may be doing. This does not serve the interests
of good governance.
- Democracy is reflected more by more or less proper elections than by
changeovers in power.
- A strange link seems to occur between the lack of changeover in
power and political and social stability. The point is that the CEMAC
zone shows great political and social stability in the countries where the
authorities in power have not changed for over twenty years (Cameroon
and Gabon, for example).
The Caribbean and Pacific countries 
- With a number of countries experiencing a boom in the democratic
process, it is hard to make an assessment. Haiti, for instance, is com-
pletely under construction and nothing certain and definitive can be
put forward in that area. However, there is trade union freedom there.
No information available on democracy and good governance in the
Dominican Republic. Corruption and non-compliance with workers’
and trade unionists’ rights are present in countries such as Kiribati,
Vanuatu and Fiji. Likewise, after quite an open system in the early years
of the present government administration, Barbados has returned to
obscurantism in administrative practices over recent years. Grenada
denounces the same lack of transparency in customs unions and failure
to respect certain social rights.
State of regional integration and integration into the globalised economy
ECOWAS
- The ECOWAS is already a sign of a determination to achieve sub-
regional integration. This is effective through exchanges which exist
between the countries of the West African region. For example, this
region soaks up some 5% of Guinea’s exports, not taking account of
informal cross-border transactions. 
- However, this sub-regional integration remains very weak, not just
because these countries do not produce enough tradable goods and
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show virtually the same production profile, but also because of many
internal conflicts being suffered by certain political and commercial
partners. 
- The conflict currently afflicting the Ivory Coast is a major hurdle to
this integration insofar as this country is a geo-strategic player in the
organisation of trade in this region. 
- Moreover, the fact that Nigeria, the region’s strongest economy (40%
of GDP in the ECOWAS countries) has openly adopted a protectionist
strategy also does nothing to facilitate advances in terms of integration.
The autonomous port of Cotonou, the economic power-house of
Benin, is thus seriously affected because of an 11% drop in its traffic
and a loss of competitiveness captured by the ports of other countries.
- The European Union (EU) devoted 235 million euros (or something
over 154 billion FCFA) to regional co-operation with West Africa
between 2003 and 2006 via the two major organisations, the WAEMU
(the West African Economic and Monetary Union), which brings
together the French-speaking countries of the former CFA zone, and
whose integration process is already well advanced, and the ECOWAS
(the Economic Community of Western African States) which includes
the WAEMU countries and whose treaty constitutes the reference
organisation in terms of integration. To this end, the European
Commission has adopted a co-operation strategy and indicative pro-
gramme document between the EU and the region. The strategy pro-
posed is to promote long-term convergence between the two
integration processes via: Consolidation of the customs union and rein-
forcement of the common market at the WAEMU level, and the creation of
the ECOWAS customs union and the reinforcement of the capacities of its
executive secretariat taking account of the acquis of each of the institutions.
- The reinforcement of the capacity of the organisations to capitalise on
their commercial specificities both at the level of the WTO and in the
framework of the negotiations for the economic partnership agree-
ments (EPAs) is likewise considered as an essential objective as part of
this process.
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- To this end, 50% of the allocations under the regional indicative pro-
gramme (RIPs) will be assigned to ‘support for economic integration
and trade’. Support for the definition and implementation of the
regional sectoral policies in a spirit of complementarity and subsidiarity
with the national programmes is another key element to be supported,
particularly in the transport sector, a vital component in an economic
integration policy.
- The strategy seeks to support a demand for facilitation and harmoni-
sation at regional level to allow the free movement of goods and people.
This second sector of concentration, transport, will be given 35% of the
RIP resources.
- The role of the region and in particular the ECOWAS at the political
level in terms of conflict prevention is another important thrust in the
strategy. Allocations are scheduled in this direction in the sector (15%).
Support will be maintained for important actions requiring to be con-
solidated in fields including fisheries, health or culture. 
- Integration into the globalised economy is also a reality, because
exchanges exist between the countries in this zone and the European
Union. Guinea, for instance, accounts for some 40% of imports in
value from the EU. International trade is the major instrument through
which the ECOWAS is integrated into the world economy.
- However, it must be noted that this integration remains very mar-
ginal. The outward-looking nature of the economies in the zone and
the division of labour under the colonial pact which still persists there
mean that in general, they get integrated via rent and via trade balances
with a structural deficit.
- So the problem is not to establish whether or not integration exists. It
is a long-standing historical fact. The important thing is to understand
and analyse what contribution it makes towards the process of the
development of the ECOWAS and which political strategy would make
it more useful and effective for this zone. This is a fundamental con-
cern, because the economies in the area cannot achieve much in inter-
national trade if they continue to be confined in a logic of
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complementarity inherited from colonisation, while contemporary trade
operates in accordance with a logic of competition.
- Moreover, an examination of global trade movements shows that over
half of them are intra-branch exchanges between western countries
with the same level of development and the same demand profile. This
means that the best commercial partner for an industrialised country is
another industrialised country, not a poor country.
- Although development financing is not specifically part of the EPA
negotiations, the EU has clearly intimated that aid for the implementa-
tion of the EPA will represent a central priority for the European
Development Fund (EDF). Support for regional economic integration
is already one of the cornerstones of European assistance for regional
development in Western Africa.
- In Western Africa, uniquely, the global amount of the RIP 9th EDF
(2003-2007) amounts to 250 million euros. Over the period 2008-2013,
the indicative amount of the RIP 10th EDF is 477 million euros. These
funds encourage economic diversification, the development of the pri-
vate sector, the modernisation of the public sector and the development
of human resources. These are pillars of competitive economies ready
to grasp the opportunities offered by regional integration and the EPA.
CEMAC
The institutions in place in Central Africa
- Even though displacements of people, goods and services, conver-
gence of macroeconomic policies and monetary stability remain far
from perfect in Central Africa, sub-regional integration is a reality.
Many political and economic institutions are in place and prove this.
They are the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
(CEMAC) created in 1994, the Economic Community of Central
African States (CEEAC) whose treaty goes back to 1983, and the Bank
of the Central African States (BEAC) instituted in 1972. 
- CEMAC unites 6 countries sharing the FCFA as their currency
(Cameroon, Central Africa, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and
Chad), while the CEEAC also includes Sao Tome and Principe, the
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DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Angola. Aside from these institutions, the
specific geographical position of certain countries also plays a positive
role in this sub-regional integration. For example, the CAR, a land-
locked country forming the weakest economic link in the CEMAC
depends heavily upon its neighbours (Cameroon and Congo
Brazzaville) for its circuit of imports and exports, particularly via the
ports of Douala in Cameroon and Pointe-Noire in Congo. Moreover,
this country is negotiating its EPA via the CEMAC. 
- Aside from the fact that more still needs to be done to achieve the
harmonisation of monetary and budgetary policies, many other obsta-
cles are hindering this sub-regional integration. These include the lack
of a transnational road network to reinforce the physical, economic and
political bonds between the States. Intra-regional trade likewise remains
very low (1.9% of exchanges in 2002) despite some significant progress.
The other obstacles are the civil wars which certain countries have suf-
fered, and the political conflicts between neighbouring States to which
they lead. Rwanda and Uganda are currently engaged in a conflict with
the DRC, which is accusing them of organised aggression. Things are
so bad that the DRC wants to continue the negotiations for its own
EPA within CEMAC and not within the COMESA.
- Integration into the globalised economy is also a fact, since it occurs
through international trade organised since colonisation. The fact that
these countries all concentrate on the production of primary products
means that their integration into international trade is just as unstable
as their balance of payments, which varies depending on international
trade conditions and other internal political factors. So it is interna-
tional integration through income from oil (Gabon), mining (DRC,
Central African Republic) and farming (Burundi) that dominates in
this region.
The action of the EU in reinforcing regional integration 
in Central Africa
- The specific objective of co-operation between the EU and Central
Africa in the regional economic integration sector and support for trade
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is to contribute to the gradual embedding of Central Africa in the
world economy through the consolidation of the regional economic
space. 
- The results expected are the intensification of exchanges and the
improvement of the competitiveness of the region’s economies, an
increase in levels of growth and an improvement to the capacities for
the formulation of regional policies.
- To help the region to implement its agenda, the RIP must contribute
to the reinforcement of integration mechanisms, via horizontal activi-
ties in support of the regional institutions, in the countries concerned
and the private sector in the region. It is in this context that the plan is
for the CEMAC Executive Secretariat to be reinforced, so as to improve
its organisational, planning and management capacities. Particular
attention will be paid to the reinforcement of the capacities for analysis,
through the setting in place of the right tools in terms of help in the
design of regional integration policies and decision-making assistance
(economic impact evaluations and processing and analysing data). 
- This project should make it possible to deliver ‘advisory assistance’
and logistical support to the CEMAC Executive Secretariat in various
priority sectors for the regional integration process: customs union,
multilateral surveillance, organisational study, tools and procedures for
budgetary and accounting management.
- Moreover, this programme represents a first experience of co-opera-
tion between the EU and the CEMAC Executive Secretariat and must
make it possible for the institutions concerned to learn to work
together.
- This project forms the key element in the European Commission’s
effort to give the CEMAC region Member States some tools with
which to manage their harmonious integration and their insertion into
the world economy. The project relies on training actions and actions
in support of co-ordination as well as the provision of equipment and
the financing of studies. It runs on a basis of consistency and comple-
mentarity with the one provided by French co-operation since 2002.
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- To this end, transport and telecommunications are priority sectors in
the co-operation between the EU and Central Africa in order to rein-
force regional integration. The objective of this co-operation is the
establishment of a priority transport network, well maintained by the
States. The results expected are the improvement of exchange condi-
tions thanks to the lifting of the physical and non-physical obstacles
and consequently, the improvement in time and cost of carrying goods
across the region. As an example, 30 to 40% of the RIP resources are
devoted to these sectors.
- In light of the crisis situations existing in 2002 and 2003 in certain
countries in the region (CAR, Congo, Chad), and the possible effects
of cross-border contagion (the Great Lakes conflict and Sudan), the
EU-Central Africa co-operation strategy for 2003-2007 has provided
for support for conflict prevention and political dialogue, and the
implementation of the regional initiatives and actions responding to
the specific problems of the countries concerned by the conflicts or
upheavals.
- As an example, 5-10% of the RIP resources are earmarked for this co-
operation sector (excluding concentration). Over the period 2003-
2007, the co-operation actions will relate inter alia to: support to the
CEEAC for the implementation of the MARAC (Early Warning
Observation and Monitoring System for Central Africa); support for
regional initiatives designed to prevent and settle crises, including
DDRRR (Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reintegration
and Repopulation) actions.
- More precisely, support for the CEEAC might target the following
elements: (I) a study and/or a feasibility seminar on the subsequent
stages of the development of the mechanism, notably the setting up of
zone bureaux; (II) a programme of institutional support, covering inter
alia the questions of the collection and utilisation of the information;
(III) the potential outfitting of MARAC in terms of telecommunica-
tions.
- In these cases, the involvement of countries like Burundi, Rwanda,
the DRC and Angola in any programme of support for this mechanism
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will call for cofinancing, notably on the basis of the respective NIPs
and/or the RIPs of the regions participating under the 9th EDF.
- The main measures that the region needs to take in order to con-
tribute to the implementation of the strategy lie in the commitment of
the States to the establishment of solid co-operation with the conflict
prevention mechanisms set in place notably by the OAU at continental
level.
East Africa and Southern Africa (COMESA, SADC)
The institutions in place in the zone
- Southern Africa includes a number of regional integrations and agree-
ments. It is a meeting place of several initiatives and econo-political
integration groupings in sub-Saharan Africa. The point is that the
CEEAC also includes Sao Tome and Principe, the DRC, Rwanda,
Burundi and Angola. 
- Aside from these institutions, the specific geographical position of
certain countries also plays a positive role in this sub-regional integra-
tion. For example, the central position of the DRC means that that
country is at the confluence of several other sub-regional institutions
and is automatically a member of them. Aside from the above institu-
tions, the DRC is also a member of the South Africa Development
Community (SADC), through which it participates in the RIP and the
negotiations of an EPA with the EU, the Association des Banques
Centrales d’Afrique (ABCA), the Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Economic Community of the
Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL). Burundi is also a member of most of
these sub-regional institutions and organisations.
- Aside from the fact that more still needs to be done to achieve the
harmonisation of monetary and budgetary policies, many other obsta-
cles are hindering this sub-regional integration. These include the lack
of a transnational road network to reinforce the physical, economic and
political bonds between the States.
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- Intra-regional trade likewise remains very low (1.9% of exchanges in
2002) despite some significant progress. The other obstacles are the
civil wars which certain countries have suffered, and the political con-
flicts between neighbouring States to which they lead. Rwanda and
Uganda are still not on good terms with the DRC, which is accusing
them of organised aggression. Things are so bad that the DRC is going
to continue the negotiations for its EPA within CEMAC and not
within the COMESA.
Integration into the globalised economy
- Integration into the globalised economy is also a fact, since it occurs
through international trade organised since colonisation. The fact that
these countries all concentrate on the production of primary products
means that their integration into international trade is just as unstable
as their balance of payments, which varies depending on international
trade conditions and other internal political factors. So it is interna-
tional integration through income from mining (DRC) and farming
(Burundi).
- On 11 October 1999, South Africa and the European Union signed a
Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) following
four years of difficult negotiations. Although this agreement was not
ratified until 2004, certain aspects of it have been in force since 2002
and form the basis of relations between the EU and South Africa.
- After having started the negotiation of their EPA within the
COMESA in October 2005, the ACP in this area decided in February
2006 to join forces with South Africa and to draw on the TDCA to
negotiate the EPAs with the European Union. The finance ministers
of these countries have already suggested under the aegis of South
Africa, whose status as an emerging country in economic terms seems
to act favourably for them in the negotiations for a new commercial
regime.
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The Caribbean and Pacific countries 
The existing integration institutions
- In the Dominican Republic, regional integration and integration into
the globalised market go hand in hand with the entry into force on 1
January last year of the free trade treaty between Central America, the
USA and the Dominican Republic (DR-CAFTA). Almost 90% of the
public sectors have satisfactorily completed the procedures and the
adjustments necessary for the entry into force of DR-CAFTA. This
means that Haiti is also compulsorily integrated, not only through its
ties with these countries, but also through its external trade, however
low its volume.
- Barbados, Grenada, Jamaica and Surinam are well integrated in sub-
regional terms and in terms of the globalised economy, even though
they are not big players in the latter arena. Sub-regional integration
occurs via a set of political and economic institutions. This regional
integration has seen an acceleration in terms of legislative actions. On
30 January 2006, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Surinam, Trinidad
and Tobago signed the CSME agreement removing all the restrictions
on movements of capital, goods, services and persons. 
- Other CARICOM (Caribbean Community) countries have signalled
their intentions to integrate this agreement in 2006. However, there are
no institutions making it possible to monitor the application of this
agreement; hence the fact that the common desire to establish a CARI-
COM passport continues not to be acted upon, because no institution
tasked with implementation of the decisions taken (restriction agency)
exists yet. Outside of CARICOM, through which the Cotonou
Agreements are negotiated and which thus integrates these countries
into the world economy, other regional institutions exist, such as the
OECS (Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States).
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Sheet 8: Countering the limits of the ‘Everything but Arms’
initiative and rising to the challenges of reciprocity in the EPAs 
From the point of view of Africa, the ‘Everything but Arms’ initiative
(see box 1), may theoretically have consequences such as improvements
to conditions for access to the European markets for the beneficiaries
and the erosion of the existing preferences for the non-beneficiaries.
However, it has to be noted that this initiative does not affect all the
ACP. While certain ACP countries have in fact refused to sign it (see
box 2), not all the EU countries have responded favourably to the
demand by the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden to extend the
‘Everything but Arms’ initiative to all the ACP. And when we realise
that the 39 ACP which have ratified this initiative are also involved in
free trade, we wonder whether the advantages do not cancel each other
out in the same way as the commercial restriction that it wanted to
impose on arms.
The principle of reciprocity is another focal point for numerous anxi-
eties and issues in the ACP. In the Cotonou Agreements, the ACP were
simply required not to treat the EU less favourably than any other
industrialised commercial partner. The EPAs, on the contrary, plan to
offer duty-free access for the bulk of the EU’s exports to the ACP
States. This gives rise to the following concerns: 
- the liberalisation required on the part of the ACP to introduce reci-
procity will inevitably lead to adjustment costs for these States in the
form of increased competition for local producers and the arrival of
lower commercial taxes into the State coffers;
- does the reciprocity also apply between the ACP members of the
EPAs?
- can different members introduce different preferences vis-à-vis the
EU?
- what proportion of imports from the ACP needs to be made free of
tariffs?
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- what is the pace of the introduction of the reciprocity? How can we
avoid protectionism of the quality standards imposed by the EU on
ACP farm produce?
- what is the impact on the productive fabric of the ACP of the intro-
duction of the trade in services in the EPAs?
- with regional integration being a complex, long-term process as wit-
ness the historical construction of the EU, can it be effective when it is
occurring in the ACP hastily and under pressure from the EPAs? The
question is all the more relevant because the Commission is asking the
Southern Africa Customs Union to complete its customs union in 2008
and not in 2010 as was scheduled in the timetable for this region.
These are some fundamental questions to be rigorously examined in
order to properly manage the EPAs and avoid social drawbacks because
of the effects of evictions and the lack of positive social effects.
Box 2: Objectives of the ‘Everything but Arms’ initiative
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- The ‘Everything but Arms’ initiative is an innovative proposal by the European
Commission to eliminate quotas and customs duties for all products except arms,
imported from the 48 poorest countries in the world.
Timetable: the elimination of customs duties and quotas applicable to virtually all
products took effect on 5 March 2001; the complete liberalisation of trade in
sugar, rice and bananas will be phased in over a transitional period. The duties
applied to bananas will be lowered by 20% per year from 1 January 2002 and elim-
inated no later than 1 January 2006; duties on rice will be reduced by 20% on
1 January 2006, by 50% on 1 September 2007 and by 80% on 1 September 2008,
finally being scrapped no later than 1 September 2009. Duties levied on sugar will
be reduced by 20% on 1 July 2006, by 50% on 1 July 2007 and by 80% on 1 July
2008, and eliminated no later than 1 July 2009.
Box 3: African States parties to the draft EU-ACP partnership agreements
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West Africa (ECOWAS):  
Benin*, Burkina Faso*, Cape Verde*, Ivory Coast, Gambia*, Ghana, Guinea*,
Guinea Bissau*, Liberia*, Mali* ; Mauritania* Niger*, Nigeria, Senegal*, Sierra
Leone*, Togo*.
Central Africa (CEMAC):
Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, CAR*, Chad*, Sao Tome and
Principe*, DRC*.
Southern and Eastern Africa:
Burundi*, Comoros*, DRC*, Djibouti*, Eritrea*, Ethiopia*, Kenya, Madagascar*,
Malawi*, Mauritius*, Uganda*, Rwanda*, Seychelles, Sudan*, Zambia*,
Zimbabwe.
South Africa:
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho*, Mozambique*, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania.
* = States in the LDC category benefiting from the ‘Everything but Arms’ initiative.
Sheet 9: The EPAs must succeed and give effective shape to the
regional integrations of the ACP countries
Meaning and role of regional integration
Regional integration refers to two types of realities, one natural and one
constructed or institutional. The point is that the idea of regional inte-
gration refers not just to the countries grouped by specific geographical
zones, but also to institutional constructions giving rise to singular
political and economic blocs.
The regions and their economic blocs vary in terms of their size and
their ambitions. They may equally emerge following a set of historical
and geographical factors linking several States (such as the ACP and the
EU), or be the result of alliances or a political project shared by those
States (such as the EU and South Africa). They may also either corre-
spond to a simple free trade area, or be pushing integration further. In
general, they tend to be very dynamic, for they can extend the integra-
tion, reduce it, record the arrival on board of new members or the loss
of old ones.
Even though several regions and their economic blocs already existed
before the all-out liberalisation of trade with globalisation, several
countries rely on such organisations to:
- harmonise their monetary, financial, economic and social poli-
cies;
- protect themselves from competition by not exposing themselves
to international competition in sectors and industries still under
construction;
- get negotiating power in order to escape from imposed liberali-
sation or to define it on its own terms;
- gain a huge regional market allowing them to depend less on
external markets;
- impose a development profile in the negotiations;
- exploit the complementarities and the economies of scale and to
create synergies in order to organise regional public services,
infrastructures (security/defence) and regional institutions to
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guarantee respect for the planned framework in order to channel
reforms and internal policies and reinforce their credibility;
- define and integrate the best regional practices in terms of politi-
cal and economic governance;
- exert collective pressure on the countries deviating from the
regional development criteria, etc. 
That said, when it comes to liberalisation, an agreement creating a
regional economic zone has a twofold effect: by liberalising trade
within the zone, it represents an important step towards planetary com-
petition and liberalisation. However, it also creates an economic bloc
which is a way of resisting that liberalisation and providing protection
against that competition by setting in place a singular institutional
matrix to manage its development model.
When it comes to ACP/EU co-operation, the Economic Partnership
Agreements (EPAs) effectively rely upon the principle of regional inte-
gration. It is then a matter of strengthening the local markets and
developing trade within the region itself. This will make it possible at
one and the same time to facilitate local trade and to make the region
more attractive to investors. The EPA will then serve to bolster the eco-
nomic partnerships between this regional market and the European
Union and to gradually liberalise commercial relations between the lat-
ter. The ACP economies will thus be able to diversify, put an end to
their dependency vis-à-vis the preferential aspect to the markets, and
get better integrated into the world economy. The negotiations seeking
binding commitments are currently being fast-tracked with a view to
the conclusion of the EPAs in 2008. But there is still a mismatch
between the ACP and the EU on the ways and means to guarantee in
practical and operational terms on the determination and the capacity
of the European Commission to respond to their concerns regarding
the reinforcement of competitiveness, the reduction of the costs linked
to the adjustments, the liberalisation of trade and the erosion of the
preferences in such a way that they are able to realise the potential of
the market under the EPAs.
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To this end, the trade union movement insists on the fact that the
prime objective of these negotiations is the development of the ACP
and the fight against poverty: hence it is urging the ACP to lay down
criteria to be respected by the EPAs in order that the negotiations do
not deviate from those two objectives. They are: supposed integration
into the world economy; social development; poverty reduction, and
respect for workers’ rights 20.
The different forms of integration and the stages they go through
We set these out in boxes 3 and 4.
Box 3: The stages in regional integration
Source: BIAO (B.), 1999, ‘Intégration régionale en Afrique Centrale’, L’intégration régionale en Afrique Centrale, Bilan et per-
spectives, pp. 29-41, Karthala, Paris.
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20. Point of view of
the European trade
union movement
(ETUC) and the inter-
national trade union
movement (ICFTU
and WCL), November
2002.
Degree of integration Features
Preferential trade zone Reduction of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers
Free-trade zone Elimination of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers
Customs union Free-trade zone 
+ common external tariff
Common market Customs union 
+ free circulation of productive factors
Economic union Common market 
+ harmonisation of economic policies
Complete economic 
integration
Economic union 
+ unification of economic and sectoral policies
Box 4: The different forms of integration
Source: HUGON (Ph.), 1991, ‘L’intégration régionale africaine, un processus contradictoire’, Intégration régionale et ajuste-
ment structurel en Afrique subsaharienne, Etudes et documents, Ministère de la coopération et du Développement, Paris,
pp. 19-77.
The possible obstacles to regional integrations in the ACP: 
sub-Saharan Africa
It is difficult to integrate poor countries like several sub-Saharan
African ACP countries. In general, the integration of such countries
involves not increases in wealth and capacities, but rather the reinforce-
ment of poverty and instabilities, conflicts and shortages. This com-
ment is based on the positive effects expected from integration (growing
yields and economies of scale), which have a positive impact when the
integration concerns rich countries which are institutionally strong and
politically stable, and a negative impact when the countries considering
integration are poor, as is the case with many in the ACP. To put it
another way, the cumulative effects of wealth and institutional synergies
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Integration 
by the market
Integration planned 
by the State
Integration 
by the players
The process is domi-
nated by the liberalisa-
tion of trade and the
play of comparative
advantages.
Voluntarist actions and
institutions dominate
the integration process
which implies protec-
tion, planning, a coali-
tion and equalisation
mechanisms. This
option implies the con-
struction of a draft of a
society disconnected
from the international
market and liberal
management of the
economy.
The creation of market
mechanisms and their
utilisation. Integration
consists of the con-
struction of regional
spaces for consulta-
tions between players.
which are created between the rich do not exist when poor, unstable
countries are integrated. 
That said, political, institutional and social stability is crucial. That is
why the EU and the trade unions insist jointly on a set of conditional-
ities whose function is to build up the economic, political and social
fundamentals capable of assembling these prerequisites for the success
of regional integrations in the ACP. Human rights, democracy and the
rule of law are among them.
The essential elements and the fundamentals of the EU/ACP partnership
- A crucial commitment to good governance
The Cotonou Agreement reinforces still further the political dimen-
sion of EU/ACP co-operation. Its political underpinnings go well
beyond democracy and human rights, to offer a fairly broad definition
of governance which the Commission considers to be ‘the rules, the
processes and the behaviours by which interests are organised,
resources generated and power exercised in society’ 21. In the fourth
paragraph of the preamble to that Agreement, the parties acknowledge
that ‘a political environment guaranteeing peace, security and stability,
respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law,
and good governance is part and parcel of long term development’ 22
(see box 5).
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21. May 2005, L’Union
et L’Afrique subsa-
harienne: Quel parte-
nariat? Occasional
paper, n° 58, The
European Union
Institute for Security
Studies, Paris.
22. Idem.
Box 5: Regarding the EIDHR 
(European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights)
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* The principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights
and the rule of law form a cornerstone of the European Union.
* The European Community’s external assistance programmes
total some € 5 billion p.a. in addition to European Development
Fund resources for the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries
(13.5 billion Euro under the 9th EDF between 2000-2007). This
assistance is available, inter alia, to promote human rights,
democracy and the rule of law, through programmes focused pri-
marily but not exclusively on assistance channelled via govern-
ments, much of it targeted at tackling the root causes of poverty.
* The financial instruments in favour of candidate countries (in
particular Phare) are a sound basis for a coherent treatment of the
human rights and democracy problems. In its co-operation with
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, the Commission has
already begun to consider progress in implementing institutional
reforms for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good
governance as an element in defining allocations for individual
countries within the total EDF financial envelope.
In the definition of governance, the three key features which recur and which
already existed under Lomé IV are: 
1 Respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights as defined
by international law, understood as including civil rights, politi-
cal rights, social, cultural and gender rights; 
2 Respect for the universally recognised democratic principles
which underpin the organisation of the State to ensure the legit-
imacy of its authority, the legality of its actions which are
reflected in its constitutional, legislative and regulatory system
and the existence of mechanisms for participation (the text stip-
ulates that these principles must develop in line with the demo-
cratic culture of each country, which might be a contradiction
vis-à-vis the universality of the principles raised above); 
3 Respect for the rule of law governing the structure of the State
and its operation (distribution and separation of powers, appli-
cation of the principle of legality, etc). Therefore, good gover-
nance becomes the capacity of a State to serve its citizens
through transparent and responsible management of the human,
natural, economic and financial resources with a view to sustain-
able, equitable development.
The consultation procedures
Violation of these fundamental principles may lead to the suspension
of EU development assistance, hence the proof that the conditionalities
represented by these principles serve as an external restriction agency or a
discipline structure in the framework of EU/ACP co-operation. This
explains the existence of the procedures for consultation between the
parties in co-operation, so as to draw up what we might call ‘invento-
ries’ of the ACP with due regard to the fundamentals of co-operation
through regular control which, as appropriate, takes the decisions
required on a case-by-case basis.
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The promotion of political and social dialogue
Divergences appear between the EU and the ACP on the principles for
evaluation and the sanctions which may result. The Member States
have long been split over the very principles of sanctions between the
‘moralisers’ and the ‘pragmatists’. 
Moreover, the Cotonou Agreement does not spell out what measures
are likely to be adopted in the event of a violation of the fundamentals
of co-operation. Similarly, many ACP consider these conditionalities
and the political and social dialogue imposed to be a fresh form of
interference robbing the ACP States and their governments of the
responsibility for their acts through a process of infantilisation dictated
by the master-slave logic.
That being the case, it is important to establish where the thresholds or
the tolerable or intolerable limits lie in the violation of the fundamen-
tals, by asking whether sanctions such as the suspension of the assis-
tance actually act as more of a punishment to the governments who
have behaved wrongly, or the poor and vulnerable classes. Accordingly,
it seems that a permanent commitment to the promotion of the funda-
mentals is of more use than immediate sanctions, especially when the
effect of sanctions is often a lasting loss of the authority and influence
of the party imposing it. The case of Zimbabwe, which divided the
Union over the choice between immediate economic sanctions and the
continuation of the political dialogue, says a lot about this state of affairs,
even though ultimately, the first option won out, coupled with a ban
on members of the Mugabe government entering the Union.
Aside from a few concrete actions already undertaken by the EU in
realising these fundamentals necessary for the success of regional inte-
grations (see Table 8), the challenge of the EPAs where regional integra-
tion is a central plank lies in giving effective shape to the demands by
the trade union movement on the realisation of the positive links
between trade and social development and the fight against poverty.
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Table 8: Sub-Saharan Africa: annual report 2003 on development policy and the
implementation of external assistance
Source: May 2005, L’Union et L’Afrique subsaharienne: Quel partenariat? Occasional paper, n° 58, The European Union
Institute for Security Studies, Paris.
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Prevention of conflicts, good governance and rule of law
WEST
AFRICA
Sudan
Ivory Coast
Nigeria
Togo
Sierra Leone
Ceasefire agreement
maintained
Peace negotiations
Support of electoral
process
Formation of local
administrations
Improved treatment of
prisoners and national
census
1,1
0,5
6,5
1,3
7,5
CENTRAL
AFRICA
Central
African
Republic
Peace negotiations
conducted under the
auspices of the African
Union + National census
1,9
EAST
AFRICA
DRC
Eritrea and
Ethiopia
Madagascar
Somalia
Support of electoral
process and protection of
human rights 
Projects linked to peace
process and mine clearance
Support of electoral
process
Peace negotiations in
Kenya
14,3
1,0
0,2
0,5
TOTAL EU SPENDING 34,8(million euros)


Annexes
Glossary
ACP
Group of states from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, organiza-
tion set up by the Georgetown Agreement in 1975.
Balance of payments
The balance of payments is the statistic that includes all real and finan-
cial transactions that, during a specific period of time, take place
between the residents of one country and the rest of the world.
Nationally, the balance of payments is a key element of national
accountancy owing to the inclusion of external factors that contribute
to the establishment of the gross national product (GNP) and the gross
domestic product (GDP). 
CEMAC
The Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa was set up
by a treaty signed on 16 March 1994, by six Central African countries:
Cameroon, Central Africa, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and
Chad. It is an extension of the Banque Centrale des Etats d’Afrique
Centrale (BEAC) and the Customs and Economic Union of Central
Africa (UDEAC); the CEMAC acts as a relay for and strengthens these
latter organizations.
Colonial pact 
is a self-sufficient trade regime through which the centres sell manufac-
tured products to colonies at prices higher than the world price and
buy from colonies primary products at a price higher than the interna-
tional market price. The result is economic dependence and a logic of
complementarity that confines the colonies and the subsequent inde-
pendent states to their primary, low value-added, sectors.
Competitiveness
Economic competitiveness is the capacity of a country, a town or a com-
pany to be viable and to develop in relation to other countries, towns and
companies that carry out similar activities, also called external competition.
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Dutch syndrome 
is an expression referring to a range of harmful events created in an
economy by the expansion of a sector that produces a natural resource.
This sector causes damage in the form of rapid changes in the alloca-
tion of resources and the contraction of tradable goods in the wake of a
distortion of relative prices.
Economic growth
This refers to a sustained increase over a long period of time of a pro-
duction and volume indicator. In practice, it is the indicator used for
measuring gross domestic product (GDP) and the rates of growth and
variation of the GDP. 
ECOWAS
The Economic Community of West African States was set up on 28
May 1975, by a treaty signed by 15 countries; Cape Verde joined in 1977.
EEC
European Economic Community was created by the Treaty of Rome on
25 March 1957. Starting on 1 November 1993, the name European
Community or European Union replaced that of the European
Economic Community in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty of 7
February 1992.
Free trade
A situation in which no obstacle limits or thwarts trade. Internationally,
free trade implies the elimination of customs, tax and regulatory barriers.
GDP 
is gross domestic product, which is the total value of domestic produc-
tion of goods and services in a given country in a given year. It is also a
measure of the income from production in a given country. The term
annual economic production, or simply production, are also used.
Globalization 
refers to a wide range of phenomena. From the purely economic stand-
point, it is the increasing interpenetration and interdependence of
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national economies and the submission of any transaction to the law of
value as sanctioned by the impersonal forces of the market (supply and
demand). From the geopolitical standpoint, it refers to the end of the
Cold War, the bipolar world, the declassification of non-aligned coun-
tries and the victory of democracy and the market economy. 
Technologically speaking, it refers to the development of new informa-
tion and communication technologies and the ensuing expanding con-
nections. Globalization can therefore be considered, in its most
common definition, to be the growing economic interdependence of all
the countries in the world, owing to the increase in the volume and
variety of cross-border transactions relating to goods and the fact that
technology is ever faster and more pervasive. 
GNP 
(gross national product) is the total value of the final production of
goods and services of economic operators in a given country over a
given year. Unlike the GDP, the GNP includes net income from
abroad, i.e. the yield from investments made abroad, less proceeds from
foreign investment made in the country. The GDP is a national statistic
because it reflects the value-added produced by the residents of the
country in question (principle of nationality), but it is not internal
because a part of this value-added is produced abroad. The GDP is
based on the principle of territoriality. The GNP, like the GDP, includes
the country’s VAT, whose legitimacy has been challenged.
HIPC Initiative
This is an initiative in favour of the highly-indebted poor countries
(HIPC) that consists of a global debt reduction provision for the
highly-indebted poor countries that apply adjustment programmes and
reforms backed by the IMF and the World Bank. 
IMF
Set up in 1944 at the UN financial and monetary conference held at
Bretton Woods via a treaty that entered into force in 1945 to promote
the introduction of a strong world economy. The IMF has 184 member
countries and its task, among others, is to promote international mone-
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tary cooperation, guarantee financial stability, contribute to economic
stability and facilitate international trade. 
Investment
This term refers to the use of means, in particular capital, for the pro-
duction of goods and services.
Monetarism
An economic doctrine stating that action by the state in monetary mat-
ters is useless or even harmful. It is based on the idea that a currency is
neutral and it is a simple instrument of exchange that can have no
effect on the production of wealth nor on its distribution. 
Multinationals 
are private companies conducting activities in several countries. Some
are increasingly powerful and are able to hold sway over other compa-
nies and even over states.
NSA
Non-state actors. In the spirit of the Cotonou Agreement, they include
civil society in all its forms in accordance with national characteristics,
the private sector, economic and social operators and trade union
organizations.
Politico-economic cycle
This term refers to an electoral practice consisting of making popular
economic decisions in the run-up to elections in order to get elected.
For example, a government might decide to increase wages during an
election campaign in order to secure the votes of civil servants and
other pressure groups.
PRSP
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers are set up by the government of low-
income countries in keeping with a participatory process in which
national stakeholders and external development partners, such as the
IMF, the World Bank, take part. The PRSPs describe the macroeco-
nomic, structural and social policies and programmes that a country
131
sets in motion over several years to promote growth and reduce poverty.
They also describe external financing needs and related financing
sources.
Trade balance
The trade balance of a country gives an overview of its exports and
imports of goods and sometimes services, depending on the nomencla-
ture used. These goods include manufactured goods, raw materials,
farm products, travel and transport, tourism, service and consulting
businesses, etc.
Rentier economy 
is an economy that derives the bulk of its income from the exploitation
of a rare resource. A rentier economy is one that receives on a regular
basis substantial income from abroad paid by foreigners, companies or
the government of a given country.
SADC
The Southern Africa Development Council was set up on 17 July 1992,
in Windhoek, Namibia.
Structural Adjustment Plans 
are plans imposed by the IMF and the World Bank on countries going
through economic difficulties in exchange for which they receive aid.
These countries undertake to observe a monetarist policy, to sharply
reduce public expenditure, including in the social sectors, and orient all
economic forces towards exports in order to honour their debts.
Washington consensus
This concept refers to the fundamental agreement between the IMF,
the World Bank and the OECD concerning ten economic prescriptions
that are recommended for struggling economies and make up the basis
of the Structural Adjustment Plans. The prescriptions mainly concern
budgetary discipline, guiding public expenditure, taxation favourable
to investors, the liberalization of financial markets, a stable and com-
petitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, privatizations, deregulation
and the protection of private property.
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World Bank
Created on 1 July 1944 at the Bretton Woods conference in the United
States at the same time as the IMF, the World Bank’s official task is to
support development projects, grant low-interest loans to developing
countries and interest-free loans and grants in a wide variety of sectors.
In practice, it aligns itself with the IMF and places its financial might
in the service of the Structural Adjustment Plans. It comprises two
development bodies: the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (BIRD) and the International Development Association
(IDA), and has 184 members.
133
List of works of the Cotonou Trade-Union Group
Re-established in 1992, the Lomé-Cotonou Trade-Union Group, led by ETUC
(ETUC-ICFTU-WCL) published: 
1. A Trade-Union Guide for Decentralised Cooperation (1996)
2. The Future of EU-ACP Relations – Contribution to the
Commission’s Green Paper (October 1996) 
3. The European and International Trade-Union Movement Refuses
the Social and Economic Exclusion of Africa (EU-Africa Summit,
April 2000) 
4. The Cotonou Agreement – A Trade-Union Guide – Analysis –
Innovations – Opportunities (September 2000)
5. Trade-Union Proposals for EU-ACP Relations 
a. Contractual Policy Framework 
b. Effective Social Policies 
(July 1997)
6. Trade-Union Proposals for EU-ACP Negotiators for the Future
Cotonou Convention (June 1998) 
7. Reminder of Trade-Union Proposals with EU-ACP Negotiators 
(2nd Ministerial Version - July 1999) 
8. Trade Must Serve Social Development 
About Economic Partnership Agreements 
(November 2002)
9. Expertise for Rapporteurs of the European Economic and Social
Committee - For a Social Dimension of the Economic Partnership
Agreements (2003-2004)
10. Boosting the ACP Trade Unions in the Economic Partnership
Agreements (2003) 
11. Contribution to the Mid-Term Evaluation of the Cotonou
Agreement (2004)
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12. Boosting the Capabilities of the ACP Trade Unions in the
Economic Partnership Agreements. Description and
Argumentation of the Project (March 2005) 
13. The ACP Trade Union Organisations in the Face of the ACP
Stakes. 
Risks and Opportunities and Needs in Terms of Boosting
Capabilities. 
Summary of Professor Lapeyre (UCL) of the research by the Trade-
Union Experts in the field in 24 ACP States (September 2006).
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List of the negotiation regions for Economic Partnership
Agreements (EPAs)
List of the negotiation regions for Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)
WEST AFRICA
ECOWAS + MAURITANIA
CENTRAL AFRICA
CEMAC + STP
EAST SOUTH AFRICA
ESA
Benin
Burkina Faso 
Cape Verde 
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea Biss. 
Ivory Coast 
Liberia
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone 
Togo
Cameroon
Centrafrican Rep. 
Chad
Congo
Equat. Guinea 
Gabon
S. Tome, Princ.
Burundi
Comoros
Congo (Dem. Rep.) 
Djibouti
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Kenya
Malawi
Mauritius
Madagascar
Rwanda
Seychelles
Sudan
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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SOUTHERN AFRICA
‘SADC GROUP’ CARIBBEAN PACIFIC
Angola
Botswana
Lesotho
Mozambique
Namibia
Swaziland
Tanzania
Antigua, Barb 
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Dominica
Dominican Rep. 
Grenada
Guyana
Haiti
Jamaica
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent 
St. Kitts & Nevis 
Surinam
Trinidad & Tobago  
Cook Is. 
Fed. Micron. 
Fiji
Kiribati
Marshall Is. 
Nauru
Niue
Palau
Papua N. G. 
Samoa
Solomon Is. 
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Organisations promoting and acting as partners in the project
Promoting organisation: 
CSTT 
Confédération syndicale des travailleurs du Togo  
Partner organisations: 
NTUC
National Trade Unions Confederation (Mauritius)
CASC
Confederación Autonoma Sindical Clasista (Dominican Republic)
CSTC
Confédération Syndicale des Travailleurs du Cameroun (Cameroon)
USTG
Union Syndicale des Travailleurs de Guinée (Guinea)
SFTU
Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (Swaziland)
FTUC
Fiji Trades Union Congress (Fiji Islands)
BWU
Barbados Workers’ Union (Barbados)
TUC 
Trade Union Congress (Ghana)
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International and European partners:
ICFTU
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions *
WCL
World Confederation of Labour *
ETUC
European Trade Union Confederation
ILO/ACTRAV
Bureau for Workers’ Activities of the International Labour
Organization 
* The ICFTU and the WCL have
now been wound up and on
1 November 2006 joined forces to
create the new International Trade
Union Confederation (ITUC).
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Experts who have collaborated on the trade union guide
Name Country of residence Federation/union
M. Adrien Beleki AKOUETE Togo CSTT
Mr. Kwasi ADU - AMANKWAH Ghana Ghana TUC
Mr. Felix ANTHONY Fiji FTUC
M. Ephraïm BALEMBA GUBANDJA Benin UCL
M. Toolsyraj BENYDIN Mauritius NTUC/FCSU
M. Dominique BICAMUMPAKA Rwanda COTRAF
Mr. José GOMEZ CERDA Dominican Republic CASC
Ms. Veronica GRIFFITH Barbados BWU
Mr. Kouglo Boèvi LAWSON BODY Togo CSTT
Mr. Thierry AMOUGOU Belgium UCL
Mr. Grégoire NGALAMULUME Belgium UCL
M. Frédéric LAPEYRE Belgium UCL
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Title at Federation Countries under study
Secretary General Project promoter
Secretary General Ghana
National Secretary Fiji, Kiribati, Vanuatu
Researcher at UCL Benin, Centrafrican Rep., Congo, Gabon,
Burundi 
President Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles, Comoros
President Rwanda
Haiti, Dominican Republic
Supervisor, Research Department Barbados, Jamaica, Surinam & Grenada
Economist, teacher-cum-researcher 
at University of Lomé
Burkina Faso, Guinea, Senegal, Togo
Researcher / Senior Expert Trade union guide
Researcher / Junior Expert Trade union guide
Professor Summary report of national reports and 
trade union guide
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Project coordination Committee 
For the ACP countries:
Adrien Akouete (Confédération Syndicale des Travailleurs du Togo), 
José Gómez Cerda (Confederacion Autonoma Sindical Clasista -
Dominican Republic), 
Felix Anthony (Fiji Trade Unions Confederation), 
Kwasi Adu Amankwah (Trade Union Congress - Ghana)
All the members of the Cotonou Follow-up Committee of the
European Economic and Social Committee
For the ETUC: 
Gérard Fonteneau and Gabrielle Clotuche 
For the ICFTU
James Howard and Mohsen Ben Chibani 
For the WCL:
Eduardo Estevez and Isabelle Hoferlin, 
accompanied by Karin Debroey ACV-CSC
For ACTRAV/ILO:
Jim Baker and François Murangira
NB: From 1st November 2006, the
ITUC replaced the WCL and the
ICFTU; Isabelle Hoferlin and
Ramon Vivanco were appointed to
represent the ITUC.
European Trade Union Confederation 
Boulevard du Roi Albert II, 5
B-1210 Brussels
Belgium
Tel.: +32(0) 2 224 04 11
Fax: +32(0) 2 224 04 54
E-mail: etuc@etuc.org
Internet: www.etuc.org
International Trade Union Confederation 
Boulevard du Roi Albert II, 5
B-1210 Brussels
Belgium
Tel.: +32(0) 2 224 02 11
Fax: +32(0) 2 201 58 15
E-mail: info@ituc-csi.org 
Internet: www.ituc-csi.org 
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